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A. THESIS OVERVIEW 
In the mid-1990s, during the debate concerning the disposition of the Black Sea 
Fleet, a joke was overheard on the streets of Sevastopol: A Russian and a Ukrainian find 
$1,000 on the street.  The Russian turns to his buddy and says, “Let’s split it like 
brothers!”  The Ukrainian shakes his head and responds, “No thanks.  Let’s split it 50-
50.”1  So goes the “big brother, little brother” relationship between Ukraine and Russia.  
For many people in Ukraine, far too many years have passed in which Russia played the 
patronizing role, often with brutal effects, in its relations with Ukraine.  Keeping this 
historical relationship in mind, this thesis poses the question of how Ukraine can solidify 
its existence as an independent member of the world community without deepening or 
getting locked into its traditional frictions with Russia. 
Given the long history of difficult relations between the two nations, the future 
strength and independence of Ukraine could clash with Russia’s inherent interests.  No 
other international relationship embodies the expression “familiarity breeds discontent” 
better than the Ukrainian – Russian situation.  Since this familiarity exists, the stronger 
and larger Russia can intimidate Ukraine to comply with Russian interests.  Prior to the 
end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine embarked upon a 
course of independence that requires it to become more self-sufficient and able to reject 
overt threats from Russia. 
Independent since 1991, Ukraine continues to struggle in its efforts to improve its 
political stability and economy.  Because of its history with Russia, Ukrainian leaders 
measure their actions against the domestic and foreign interests of Russia.  Policies taken 
by Ukraine, especially those that would expose Ukraine to Western influences and those 
independent of Russia’s approval, may cause distrust and suspicion in Moscow.  In the 
future, Ukraine is likely to make numerous political decisions that may cross Russian 
interests.  By exploring these possibilities and problems, the thesis will answer the 
                                                 
1 Tyler Felgenhauer, “Ukraine, Russia, and the Black Sea Fleet Accords,” Woodrow Wilson School of 
Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, February 1999.  Accessed online 27 August 2002, 
<http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~cases/papers/ukraine.html>. 
2 
questions:  should Ukraine adopt a competitive or cooperative policy with Russia, or 
some combination of both, in order to fulfill its national security goals?  And, if it seeks 
to combine the two, how can it best do so? 
The United States and the West also are interested in the strength and sovereignty 
of Ukraine.  Not only does the West desire to promote the stability of Ukraine, but it also 
would like Russia to continue to move toward non-threatening conduct toward Ukraine.  
Richard Murphy stated in the summer of 1999: 
What happens in Ukraine will have an impact one way or 
another on Europe’s peace and stability.  If Ukraine stays 
the course toward democracy and free markets with the 
attendant benefits for ordinary Ukrainians, this can have a 
beneficial influence on the political development of Russia.  
When Russia sees that Ukraine is strengthening its 
independent statehood, the dream of restoration of the 
empire will fade among the Russian political elite.2 
Most political and economic bodies in Ukraine, Russia, and the West readily 
acknowledge that Russia bargains with a stronger hand.  Over the last decade, a number 
of accords that included Russia as the regional power have been skewed in Moscow’s 
favor.  The Russian extraction of Ukraine’s tactical nuclear warheads in 1992 proved 
advantageous to Moscow.  The subsequent difficulty in achieving an accord over the 
disposition of the strategic nuclear forces required diplomatic intervention on the part of 
the United States because Kiev did not trust Moscow to follow through on strict bi-lateral 
agreements.  Ukraine also concluded, even prior to releasing all of its tactical nuclear 
weapons, that it should receive something for surrendering its tactical and strategic 
nuclear weaponry.  Subsequent negotiations with Russia on the disposition and control of 
the Black Sea Fleet caused sizable rifts between the two states as well as domestic 
intrigue in both countries.  Throughout most negotiations since 1991, the willingness of 
Moscow to inject energy asset management, i.e. to either stop the flow of gas exports to 
Ukraine or to change the agreed compensation for Ukrainian debts has usually forced 
Ukraine to accept a weaker outcome than Russia. 
                                                 
2 Richard W. Murphy, “Ukraine In Europe,” The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
September 1999, p. 8.   Accessed online, <http://www.csis.org/europe/pubs/UkraineInEurope.pdf >. 
3 
The thesis also addresses several other questions:  What does Ukraine need to 
change to improve its political and economic strength and are these changes institutional 
or constitutional in nature?  Do any of the necessary changes violate the official policy 
interests or domestic well being of Russia?  Could economic and political differences 
between the two nations escalate to undesired military consequences?  What are the 
Western interests in Ukraine and how can the West best assuage Russian concerns about 
Ukrainian gains in political, economic, and military strength? 
Western Europe and the United States provide Ukraine with politically stable, 
economically viable, and militarily capable models.  Since the December 1991 plebiscite 
and Ukraine’s independence from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the 
Ukrainian government has taken several steps to improve its security and to establish its 
own independence from Russia.  Not only has Ukraine attempted some social, political, 
and economic reforms to engender Western investment, but it also has engaged in 
military exercises and training with the West and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) under the auspices of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP).  The 1990s also 
exemplified the positive and negative effects that the West can have when assisting the 
negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.  Efforts to assist Ukraine and Russia, through 
trade, negotiations, military contacts, or sanctions can work to the betterment or 
detriment of Ukrainian strength. 
Even though Ukraine has consistently stated its intentions of becoming a nation 
that adheres to the European conscience, the government under Leonid Kuchma has 
recently operated without the same sense of urgency as compared to the early-1990s.  
Lagging internal reforms coupled with unflattering accusations concerning the official 
abuse of the press (including possibly sanctioned murder) and illegal trade with rogue 
states has dampened Ukrainian-United States relations.  Until these matters are addressed 
and resolved to the satisfaction of the international community and the Western powers, 
Ukraine will find integration into Europe to be a slow process. 
Since 1991, when the international community recognized Ukrainian and Russian 
independence, Russia has not officially challenged Ukraine’s sovereignty.  However, for 
numerous reasons ranging from Russia’s desire to maintain beneficial economic 
4 
commerce with one of its largest trading partners to Russia struggling to find its own 
“national identity,” Moscow has periodically made references to Russia’s duty and 
responsibility to maintain preeminence over the former Soviet states.  In October 1993, 
domestic interests pushed Russian President Boris Yeltsin to reassess his stance toward 
Russian involvement with the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU).  Yeltsin stated 
that Russian security policies should focus on protecting Russia’s vital interests – 
especially in the “near abroad.”3 
In the fall of 2000, after receiving pressure from Russia, Ukrainian President 
Kuchma dismissed the “Western-oriented” Borys Tarasiuk as Foreign Minister.4  More 
recently, during the 2001 election in Ukraine, the Russian state-owned press excoriated 
the Ukrainian Prime Minister Victor Yushchenko, a Ukrainian-American by birth, as a 
sinister means of United States maintaining control over the Prime Minister and thus over 
Ukraine’s official functions.5  Though President Vladimir Putin has not made bold and 
abrasive comments in public, his government continues to expand Russian influence 
within Ukraine by allowing Russian interests to purchase commercial commodities 
throughout Ukraine in lieu of official Ukrainian energy debts.  Unlike other vocal 
politicians, such as Vice-Speaker of the Russian Duma Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, Putin is 
more sophisticated in his approach to Ukraine.  He aligns himself with the 
ethnonationalist Russian interests, stating to the Congress of Russian Compatriots in 
October 2001 that Russian compatriots are “a spiritual community of different ethnic 
groups oriented towards Russian culture and language.”6  With such a stance, Moscow 
readily supports actions and movements within the former Soviet states that strive to 
establish “Russian” as an official language.  Simultaneously, Putin aligns himself with 
                                                 
3 Dimitri Baluyev, “European Security in the 1990s: New Definition and New Institutional 
Frameworks,” Eurosecurity ,Nizhniy Novgorod, 1994, accessed online 8/17/2002, 
<http://www.kis.ru/~dbalu/lib/eurosec.htm.>  More recently, Russian state-owned press excoriated the 
Ukrainian Prime Minister Yushchenko, a Ukrainian-American by birth, as a sinister means of U.S. control 
over the Prime Minister and her functions. Ariel Cohen, “Crisis in Ukraine: U.S. Interests under Threat,” 
The Heritage Foundation, 2 May 2001.  Accessed online, 
<http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasis/Test050201.cfm>. 
4 Ariel Cohen, “Crisis in Ukraine: U.S. Interests under Threat,” The Heritage Foundation, 2 May 2001.  
Accessed online, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Russiaand Eurasis/Test050201.cfm>. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Taras Kuzio, “Russian National Identity and Foreign Policy Toward the ‘Near Abroad’,” Prism, vol 
8, issue 4, The Jamestown Foundation, Washington D.C., 4/30/2002.  Accessed online, 
5 
Muscovite oligarchic influences, ensuring that the domestic power brokers are sated as 
well. 
Putin has presented himself well as an arbiter of Russian strength.  Skillfully 
mollifying most domestic sectors through supporting Russian interests within the FSU, he 
has shrewdly positioned Russia to benefit from trade agreements between Russia and the 
states of the FSU.  During the 1990s, as Ukraine looked to the West for economic and 
security arrangements, Russia parlayed its influence to gain equal or greater arrangements 
from the West as well.  In May 2002, when Ukraine officially broached the subject that 
Kiev desired to embark upon the path toward full NATO membership, Moscow did not 
voice its previous concerns; rather President Putin stated, “Ukraine has its own relations 
with NATO.”  The official change of heart may have been facilitated by Russia 
previously receiving its own new status at the NATO table as an almost equal partner.7  
Though officially unopposed by Moscow, such progressive integration of Ukraine with 
the West causes concern in the Russian leadership.  The further west that Ukraine moves, 
the less influence that Russia has over its historic “brother.”  Determining how far 
Ukraine can go, while understanding the repercussions that its actions will have on the 
perceptions of the Russian domestic actors, is a central concern in this thesis. 
Ukraine also has taken other steps to rebuff any possible intentions of Russia to 
reincorporate the “near-abroad” by entering alliances with other post-Soviet states.  Since 
Ukraine shares many societal features with Russia, independent actions by Ukraine may 
produce objections from Moscow as well as Ukrainian internal dissent and political 
change.  If Ukraine decides to erect military and political barriers between itself and 
Russia, the Russian response could be more spirited and coercive.  This leads to an 
underlying assumption of the thesis: it would be undesirable for the West to have Ukraine 
and other “near-abroad” states officially reunite with a rejuvenated Russia in an empire 
similar to the defunct Soviet Union, especially an empire armed with nuclear weapons.  
In 2001, Ariel Cohen8 stated that the status of Ukraine “will decide the future of Russia 
                                                 
<http//Russia.Jamestown.org/pubs/view/pri_008_004_001.htm>. 
 7 Oleg Varfolomeyev, “Ukraine Turns to NATO,” Time Europe, 20 June 2002.  Accessed online, 
<http://www.time.com/time/europe/eu/daily/0,13716,264234,00.html>. 
8 Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is a Research Fellow at the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for 
International Studies at The Heritage Foundation. 
6 
as a democratic nation state, as opposed to a neo-imperial super-state.”9  Zbigniew 
Brzezinski voiced the same thought in 1994, when he stipulated that if Russia suborns 
and subordinates Ukraine, Russia automatically becomes an empire.  Likewise, if 
Ukraine were strong enough to rebuff Russian intrusions, then Russia would find it 
harder to hold on to any lingering dreams of an empire.  Brzezinski premised Ukraine’s 
future strength upon whether or not Ukraine instituted massive economic reforms, the 
success of the consolidation of Ukrainian statehood, the integration that Ukraine would 
have with NATO and the West, and Ukraine’s economic and political ties to Russia.10 
As the Soviet Union dissolved in the early 1990s, the West offered assistance and 
incentives to the former Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern Europe either through 
admission to the European Union (EU) or to NATO.  Except for the Baltic countries, the 
West has not presented comparable incentives to the former Soviet Republics, also 
known as the Newly Independent States (NIS).  For strategic and economic reasons, 
Western governments and investors focused most of their efforts on Russian 
modernization, after which the West directed additional funding and integration efforts at 
the states of the former Soviet Union.  Thus, Ukraine forged some ties with the West 
while having to simultaneously maintain its bonds with Russia.  While straddling the 
political and economic fence of reforms, Ukraine has not been able to substantially 
improve its economic and military conditions.  It must make hard choices to strengthen 
its posture; some are fraught with uncertainty. 
Ukraine and Russia, as sovereign states, will continue to interact with each other; 
however, they will not do so in a vacuum.  There are other strong nations, international 
financial institutions, and military blocs that must be accounted for as Ukraine and Russia 
conduct their business on the international stage.  An analysis of the bilateral relationship 
must also include those international influences, or at least the dominant international 
player – the United States. 
                                                 
9Ariel Cohen, “Crisis in Ukraine: U.S. Interests under Threat.” 
10Jennifer D.P. Moroney, “Ukraine’s Foreign Policy on Europe’s Periphery: Globalization, 
Transnationalism, and the Frontier.”  In Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy: Theoretical and 
Comparative Perspectives, edited by Jennifer D.P. Moroney, Taras Kuzio, and Mikhail Molchanov, 
Praeger, Westport, Connecticut, 2002, p. 61. 
7 
To frame the argument, the thesis employs a collective framework drawn mainly 
from the works of two international relations theorists that ascribe to the “defensive 
realism” school of thought -- Charles L. Glaser and Jack Snyder.  The framework draws 
heavily from Glaser’s work with respect to decisions about a state’s defensive needs; 
however the thesis expands Glaser’s model to include the ramifications of decisions 
about economic and political needs as well.  Glaser’s work focused primarily upon the 
effects that one state might have upon another in bilateral relations without attributing 
any role to other international factors.  To fill this void the thesis framework incorporates 
international factors identified by Snyder that could influence the strength and 
effectiveness of a government in its pursuit of its existing foreign policy goals. 
Glaser stipulates that analyses that “fail to consider political consequences [of a 
state’s national security strategy] risk prescribing either too much or too little military 
capability and, often more important, the wrong kind, which can reduce states’ 
security.”11  In his 1992 article, “Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding 
and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Model,” Glaser elaborates on the logic of the 
deterrence12 and spiral models13 that are associated with the security dilemma.14  Glaser 
concludes that during the Cold War, the “debate over U.S. national security policy often 
turned on divergent beliefs about the consequences of competitive and cooperative 
                                                 
11 Charles L. Glaser, “Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral 
and Deterrence Model,” World Politics, vol 44, no. 4, Center of International Studies, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, July 1992, p. 499. 
12 Within the realism theory of international relations, since there is no international government that 
sets and enforces the conduct of states, states interact in an anarchical environment.  States are the primary 
actors and since some states are stronger than others, absent any international enforcement, the strong state 
can apply undue pressure for its own gain on the weaker state.  The weaker state must deter the stronger 
state (aggressor) by showing its willingness to go to war in order to protect its security, thereby forcing the 
aggressor to contemplate if its aggressive actions would involve greater costs than benefits. 
13 Within the anarchic system, states must provide for their own security.  Because states “tend to 
assume the worst,” states cannot rest assure that other states are entirely peaceful in their intentions.  As a 
state build arms for defense purposes, the act in itself threatens another state that, in turn, builds more 
weapons in response.  The action-reaction cycle produces a spiral towards a possible conflict neither side 
wants. 
14 “A central tenet of realism and the realist paradigm, the security dilemma arises from the situation 
of anarchy that states find themselves in.  By striving to increase their own security – by following policies 
that enhance their military capabilities – states inadvertently make others feel less secure.”  Graham Evans 
and Jeffrey Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, Penguin Books, London, 1998, 
p. 494.  States’ are unable to know the true intentions of other states and whether the other side is an 
aggressor or not.  Hence, deterrence might be necessary, but it might also be counterproductive.  If a state 
unnecessarily provokes another state, the first state could end up less secure. 
8 
military policies.”15  There were two components of the security debate: the military 
capabilities – what hardware and policies were needed “to deter or defeat the Soviet 
Union” -- and the political consequences of those military capabilities – “the effect of 
U.S. policy on the basic goals of the Soviet Union and on Soviet views of U.S. 
resolve.”16  
Within Glaser’s model, there is a defender and there is an adversary.17  The 
adversary may have different inclinations, thus the need to expand the “basic types of 
states” from simply “greedy” states as found in the deterrence model and “not greedy 
states motivated by insecurity” as found in the spiral model.18   The model expands the 
number of basic types of states by determining their amount of greed, security, and 
misperceptions (which can lead to domestic changes in the adversary).19  By identifying 
the other side’s inclinations and understanding the effects the defender’s action will have 
on the adversary (both politically and militarily), the defender can proceed upon its 
national security decisions while minimizing the risk of unintended escalation.  To stem 
adverse reactions on the part of competitors, national leaders must ensure that their stated 
military goals and policies are consistent with their military posture.  Also required is the 
need to ensure that the competitor country fully understands the purpose for the military 
goals and policies, reducing “misperceptions” and curtailing the risk of escalation.  If the 
national leaders are unable to reassure their competitor as to their non-threatening 
intentions, the competitor could experience a domestic power shift, becoming potentially 
more competitive or more cooperative. 
If Ukrainian leaders were able to comprehend the political consequences of their 
actions, it would be easier for both countries to diffuse disputes and to allow Ukrainian 
officials to achieve political and economic success.  If the Ukrainian officials are not able 
to anticipate the consequences of their actions, resulting domestic power shifts in Russia 
                                                 
15 Glaser, p. 497. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Glaser explicitly uses the terms “defender” and “adversary” within his model.  For ease in reference 
to Glaser’s body of work, the thesis will also use the same terms fully acknowledging that the term 
“adversary” carries a negative connotation.  The writer of the thesis states that it should not be construed 
that Russia is or will always be in an adversarial relationship with Ukraine. 
18 Glaser, p. 503. 
19 Ibid., p. 514. 
9 
could make Russia unstable or more competitive and thereby endanger Ukraine’s 
security.  Moreover, when Russia experiences domestic power shifts, Ukraine would not 
be the only country to feel the seismic imbalance; Europe and the United States will feel 
the political change as well. 
To assist in labeling Russia in regards to what type of intentions it has toward 
Ukraine and to help explain domestic politics in relation to international factors, the 
thesis also incorporates elements of Jack Snyder’s 1989 article “International Leverage 
on Soviet Domestic Change.”20  Snyder posits 
The direction and strength of this influence [international 
circumstances on domestic political coalitions] has varied, 
depending on (1) whether international conditions pose 
threats or offer inducements for international cooperation, 
(2) whether the already existing domestic regime is 
oriented toward liberal or imperial policies, [and] (3) 
whether that regime and its policies are strongly or weakly 
institutionalized.21 
Snyder uses historical examples of previous great powers to delineate possible 
responses from his four different regimes: weakly institutionalized liberal regimes, 
strongly institutionalized liberal regimes, weakly institutionalized imperial coalitions, and 
strongly institutionalized imperial coalitions.  The thesis uses Snyder’s hypothesis to 
further clarify the effects that Ukrainian actions would have on the Russian domestic 
structure, especially in tandem with the broader international developments. 
Despite that the international relations arguments cited focus on the domestic 
reactions of the adversary due to the military posture of the defender, the thesis expands 
the argument to include the military and domestic reactions of the adversary (Russia) to 
the political, economic, and military actions of Ukraine.  Because of the close historical 
relationship, any hypothesis that limits itself to the military interactions between the two 
countries would be dismissive of the Russian-Ukrainian relationship on the whole.  Thus, 
the thesis looks at actions and reactions to include economic and socio-political decisions 
as well as military. 
                                                 
20 Jack Snyder, “International Leverage on Soviet Domestic Change,” World Politics, vol 42, issue 1, 
October 1989, The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 1-30.  Accessed online through J-STOR  5 
September 2002, <http://www.jstor.org>. 
21 Ibid., p. 4. 
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The thesis identifies two situations and the national interests involved that directly 
impact on Ukrainian strength and sovereignty.  The energy supply dispute entails 
economic policies while the issue surrounding the demarcation and stabilization of the 
international border between Ukraine and Russia entails the military policy as well as the 
social implications.  The thesis determines which policies - competitive, cooperative, or a 
mixture of both -- best lead to Ukraine’s increased security and stability.  Additionally, 
the conclusions determine which policies provide the most favorable conditions for the 
regional prospects of the United States and NATO. 
The thesis relies on the recent actions and proclamations of Ukraine and Russia to 
determine possible future actions.  It determines probable Ukrainian military and political 
actions and the subsequent Russian reactions through consideration of present-day 
demographics, stated national interests, and viable political parties in both Russia and 
Ukraine.  The thesis makes several assumptions about the intentions of the Ukrainian 
leadership: Ukraine prefers greater internal stability; Ukraine wants to maintain its 
current international boundaries; and Ukraine wants to improve its infrastructure and 
economic situation thereby enhancing the political standing of the governing elite in the 
view of the public.  Likewise, the ruling elite in Russia desire to strengthen their internal 
control without further alienating Western benefactors.  If the political structure of either 
Ukraine or Russia changes radically and thereby becomes openly authoritarian and 
dismissive of democratic reforms, all conclusions of this thesis could be obsolete. 
B. METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The thesis attempts to formulate feasible and rational decisions for the Ukrainian 
government on volatile issues, weighing the advantages and disadvantages to Ukraine 
that would result from Russian reactions.  It factors in the domestic influences in both 
Ukraine and Russia in its analysis, seeking to identify the internal biases of the decision 
makers and how those biases affect the strength and security of an independent Ukraine. 
The thesis also has significance for the International Relations community, for it 
amalgamates different theoretical models to assist in framing the actors and their 
preferences.  It calculates the domestic influences, affected by historical understanding, 
and external causes that the actors of both nations encounter. 
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While focusing on the bilateral relationship between Russia and Ukraine, the 
thesis also situates the Russian-Ukrainian relationship within the international economic 
and diplomatic system – dominated by the West - that could provide both states greater 
stability, wealth, and acceptance.  The thesis also relies upon the general understanding 
that for the foreseeable future Russia will remain a nuclear power and thus will receive 
intended and unintended special handling from the West.  Thus, when dealing with the 
West, it is incumbent upon Ukraine to promote bilateral relationships and diplomatic 
solutions that better Ukraine but not at the expense of Russia.  The West, for realpolitik 
purposes, could not accept one-sided bargaining positions that favor Ukraine exclusively 
if those bargaining positions severely threaten Russian strategic interests, thereby 
resulting in severe international force escalation. 
C. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II (DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES ON 
UKRAINE AND RUSSIA) establishes an analytical framework for the thesis, relying 
heavily upon Glaser’s model and Snyder’s discussion of international influences.  The 
chapter explains the theoretical sources of Glaser’s model and discusses the strengths and 
weaknesses of Glaser’s model as it applies to the Ukrainian and Russian situation.  The 
second chapter also incorporates Snyder’s understanding of international factors and how 
those affect domestic regimes. 
Chapter III (SHARED HISTORY OF UKRAINE AND RUSSIA) details the 
shared past of the Ukrainians and the Russians. Starting with the contentious issue 
concerning the origins of the Kievan Rus, the chapter exposes the autocratic decisions 
and the resulting backlash during imperial and Soviet rule that invariably formed 
differing opinions and perceptions within the two states.  It concludes with an assessment 
of two important issues that arose from the Soviet Union dissolution: the formation of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States and the international debate concerning the control 
and disposition of the Ukraine’s strategic nuclear weapons.  Reviewing these two issues 
illuminates the differing attitudes and concerns of the Russians and the Ukrainians as 
each regime struggles with domestic influences and challenges. 
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The first section (Ukrainian Situation) of Chapter IV (UKRAINIAN AND 
RUSSIAN STATE OF AFFAIRS) begins with an explanation of Ukraine’s geo-strategic 
importance in terms of its location, its abundant natural resources, and size.  The existing 
infrastructure and industry of Ukraine, heavily dependent upon Russian support, coupled 
with its economic conditions, is explained.  It continues with an explanation of the 
domestic influences of Ukraine, specifically the differences arising from Ukrainian 
demographics.  The second section (Russian Political Projects) of Chapter III describes 
the current Russian leadership, Russian domestic political structure, and Russia’s 
capabilities and willingness (or lack thereof) to improve the economic standings of the 
countries of the ‘near-abroad.’  It stipulates what ‘type’ of adversary Russia is per 
Glaser’s model by identifying recent actions and policies emanating from Moscow.  It 
identifies the Russian domestic actors, how influential those actors are within the 
domestic structure of Russia, and how the domestic actors might misperceive certain 
Ukrainian actions.  It delineates two political coalitions: the ruling coalition that basically 
supports the sovereignty of the NIS and the opposing coalition, consisting of 
ethnonationalists and imperial minded communists who do not support the sanctity of the 
new borders. 
Chapter V (TWO SITUATIONS OF CONFLICTING INTEREST) analyzes two 
consistently problematic situations between Ukraine and Russia.  As each situation stands 
today, each one impinges upon Ukraine’s desires and capabilities to strengthen its 
national identity and security goals.  The thesis presents possible actions and likely 
reactions on the part of Ukraine and Russia.  The first section (Economic Situation: 
Energy Supplies) looks at the availability of energy supplies that Ukraine requires to fuel 
its domestic industry.  It proposes that Ukraine can use both competitive and cooperative 
measures in meeting its energy needs, however, Ukraine should invite Western 
investment, requiring Ukrainian reforms.  The second section (Strengthening the 
Ukrainian-Russian Border) looks at the possible ramifications and determines that 
Ukraine risks an escalatory situation if it acts in a solely competitive mode.  Ukraine 
could engender Russian support by persuading Western investment in Russia or else 
Ukraine could trade a “less important issue” for Russian acquiescence on the border 
issue. 
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Chapter VI (CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS) summarizes the 
courses of action for Ukraine in its approach to meeting its goals while assuaging Russian 
interests.  Additionally, the thesis determines that the United States and the West will 
provide a critical link to the future strength and sovereignty of Ukraine, thereby 
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II. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES ON 
UKRAINE AND RUSSIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When a nation’s leaders attempt to surmise possible repercussions of their actions, 
they can choose from a number of different methods for predicting a possible outcome. 
For the most part, the leadership can choose between two avenues, using either an 
historical analysis or a theoretical analysis. 
In the historical route, the leadership can review the past decisions that they or 
previous leaders from their country have made in regards to a similar predicament. Or 
else they can look at previous decisions that other countries have made when confronting 
similar problem.  Based on whether a previous outcome was positive or negative, they 
can proceed to follow the previous course or choose another.  However, rarely, if ever, 
are the situations exactly the same.  Thus, it is somewhat risky to base a national or 
international decision strictly upon the results of past actions.  It is naïve to expect the 
same reoccurring reaction if a previous action garnered a positive reaction, especially in 
the ever-changing dynamic of international relations. 
The theoretical route applies a template upon the inter-relations of states.  
Depending on the theory, the template emphasizes either the interactions of the states, the 
interactions of the domestic actors within the states, or the effects that international 
regimes or non-state actors have upon the state or the state’s domestic actors.  The 
presumptive position of most international relations theories is that nation-states (or other 
actors) interact with each other within a condition of anarchy, meaning that there is not an 
international government to set and enforce rules and laws.  According to realism and 
neo-realism, the state, acting for reasons of greed or self-preservation, will take measures 
to improve its own position or secure its existing position in relation to other states.  As 
states make political decisions and apply forces to ensure that their desired end-state is 
met, those same political decisions and application of forces produce simultaneous 
reactions on part of other states.  This action/reaction chain of events is the basis for the 
“security dilemma.” 
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This chapter begins by summarizing the underpinnings and implications of two 
perspectives on the security dilemma – “deterrence theory ” and the “spiral model” as 
explained by Robert Jervis.22  The chapter then explains Glaser’s adaptation of this 
model in depth, beginning with an explanation of his four different types of adversaries 
and their motives for expansion.  It follows with an elucidation of the implications that 
misperceptions can have on both the adversary and the defender. 
Glaser created his model using the international relationship, particularly the 
military actions and subsequent reactions, between the United States and the Soviet 
Union as his point of reference.  Because his model focused upon the interactions of the 
two superpowers during the bi-polar system of the Cold War, Glaser did not pay heed to 
the effects that international players had upon the contentious relationship between the 
United States and the Soviet Union.  However, with the end of the Cold War and the rise 
in significance of the international community -- at least as it is supported by the 
remaining super power -- the application of Glaser’s model to Ukrainian/Russian 
relations requires an inclusion of the international players and how those entities factor in 
to the actions and reactions of the domestic actors within Ukraine and especially Russia.  
For this purpose, the chapter will incorporate Jack Snyder’s argument that “the 
international environment has often decided the fate of many states’ domestic 
institutions.”23  Though taking a strong position on the domestic influence of the 
international factors, Snyder caveats his position by stating that international factors 
alone do not “directly and solely” determine domestic political developments.24 
Since Glaser does not take into account the international influences upon a 
country and its domestic actors, the author of this thesis perceives this omission as an 
inherent flaw of theories and models that attempt to compartmentalize different actions of 
a state as though none radically affects the other.  However, establishing possible courses 
of action for Ukraine to take in regards strengthening its border between itself and 
Russian requires more than simple conjecture.  Thus, the thesis supplements Glaser’s 
                                                 
22 Robert Jervis, “Deterrence and the Spiral Model,” Perception and Misperception in International 
Politics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1976, pp. 58-118. 
23 Snyder, p. 1. 
24 Ibid., p.3. 
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“political consequences of military strategy” model with Snyder’s model of international 
influences to assist in this endeavor. 
B. THE DETERRENCE AND SPIRAL MODELS 
In the future, whether purposefully or not, Ukraine will take security actions that 
have repercussions on the domestic politics in Russia.  In 1976, in his book, Perception 
and Misperception in International Politics, Robert Jervis argued that, despite much 
debate concerning different “deterrence theories and policies” of the United States in 
regards to the Soviet Union, the crux of the issue was how to account for Soviet 
intentions.25  This section briefly explains two alternative theories as Jervis described 
them, with special attention to the differences in the types of misperceptions each theory 
identifies as the sources of aggressive action.  The section then leads into Glaser’s 
argument starting with his critique of Jervis, wherein he states that any analysis which 
fails to fully understand the repercussions of the defender’s political actions on the 
adversary “risks prescribing either too much or too little military capability and, often 
more important, the wrong kind, which can reduce the states’ security.”26 
1. Deterrence Theory 
Jervis uses the label “deterrence theory” to describe the strategic beliefs usually 
associated with “hawks” in foreign policy debates, while suggesting moderates are more 
likely to espouse what he calls the “spiral model.”  According to Jervis, deterrence theory 
predicts that “great dangers arise if an aggressor believes that the status quo powers are 
weak in capability and resolve.”27  The anarchic system, according to the assumptions 
behind the deterrence model leads states to seek expansion either out of greed or to 
improve their security.  Since there is not a higher authority to enforce international laws, 
each state’s security capabilities are dependent upon the state itself.  By default, some 
states will be stronger than others, creating an imbalance, which presents a great 
challenge to those that are weaker. 
If an aggressive state desires to test a status quo power’s sovereignty and interests, 
the status quo power must decide upon a course of action.  According to deterrence 
                                                 
25 Jervis, p. 58. 
26 Glaser, p. 499. 
27 Jervis, p. 58. 
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theory, the status quo power can stop the aggressive state with a strong reaction, while by 
not responding at all or not emphatically enough it will invite future incursions.  Inaction 
or weakness displayed on the part of the status quo power attracts more aggression.  If the 
status quo power allows even a relatively minor act to go unchallenged, the aggressor 
will be encouraged to continue to intrude with more hostile acts, both in number and 
severity.  The longer the status quo power remains unmoved to respond, the more 
difficult it will be persuade the aggressor in the future that such aggressive acts will have 
negative repercussions for the aggressor.  To prevent such a situation, deterrence theory 
holds that the status quo power “must display the ability and willingness to wage war” 
early in the encounter.28 
Deterrence theory assumes that the aggressor believes that “moderation and 
conciliation are apt to be taken for weakness.”  If a status quo state holds this perception, 
seemingly reasonable concessions that might satisfy the objectives of the aggressor will 
not be offered by the status quo power.29  Deterrence theory assumes further that 
“friendship cannot be won by gratuitous concessions,” leading it to dismiss any use of 
incentives or bribes.  Though such “carrots” can stay the aggressor momentarily, when 
the appetite is once again charged, the status quo power will find itself in the same 
predicament, though this time the size of the bribe could be greater. 
Deterrence theory further predicts that if the balance of power is conducive, an 
effective deterrent can quickly “check aggression.”  Through firm resolve that is backed 
by capability, the defender can prove that the “combination of the high cost of a war, the 
low probability that the aggressor can win it, and the value the aggressor places on 
retaining what he has already won” make further challenges too risky for the rational 
aggressor.30 
2. Spiral Model 
Jervis relates the contrasting logic of the Spiral Model to the anarchic world of 
international relations as well, wherein sovereign states must employ their own security 
measures to buttress against any present or future threat.  Within the Spiral Model, there 
                                                 
28 Jervis, p. 58. 
29 Ibid., p. 59. 
30 Ibid., p. 60. 
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is not an outright aggressive state that desires territorial or monetary gain from others, 
rather, the state situation is stable in so far as the states are content with their own 
territorial holding.  The problem occurs when state leaders understand that anarchy 
allows aggression to occur and are unable to determine whether other state leaders are 
content with the status quo as well. Since these leaders cannot truly understand the 
thoughts and desires of other sovereign leaders, the defending state leaders “worry about 
the most implausible threats” and therefore plan for the worst.31 
With this planning comes the inevitable need to arm the state with the capability 
to defeat any perceived or possible threats.  Though the state acquires new weaponry for 
possible defensive operations, most assets can also be used for offensive operations as 
well.  As the state moves to deploy new weaponry and update its doctrine, such actions 
reduce the capability, either directly or per ratio, of a neighboring or threatened state.  In 
turn, the threatened state, not knowing the full intentions of the leaders of the first state, 
will develop new weapons and capabilities in sequence to match or surpass those of the 
first.32 
Within the paradigm, states’ leaders usually disdain war, which inherently 
becomes more expensive to all competing states.  Because of the Spiral and the resulting 
arms build-up, benign incidents take on greater importance, as the competing leaders 
come to perceive the intentions of the others in the worst possible light.  Instead of an 
accidental border crossing by a lost patrol, an incident is perceived by the opposing state 
as an aggressive probe in support of future military actions.  Situations are exaggerated 
and accidental war is the result. 
Reflecting the logic of the well-known game Prisoner’s Dilemma, Jervis writes 
that in the Spiral Model, “If each state pursues its narrow self-interest with a narrow 
conception of rationality,33 all states will be worse off than they would be if they 
cooperated.  Not only would cooperation lead to a higher level of total benefits – and this 
                                                 
31 Ibid., p. 62. 
32 Ibid., p. 64. 
33 Though having numerous definitions within the International Relations context, the common 
understanding of rationality “means following the ‘minimax’ precept [wherein] one maximizes gains or 
minimizes losses.” Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of International 
Relations, Penguin Books, London, 1998, p. 463. 
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is of no concern to the self-interested actor – but it would lead to each individual actor’s 
being better off than he would be if the relations were more conflictful.”  Due to what 
they believe is an unnecessary escalation of weaponry, coupled with the risks of 
accidental war, spiral theorists desire states to show self-constraint or make concessions 
to the other to stop the escalation.  Per the Prisoner’s Dilemma, if both sides restrain the 
escalation of force in a reasonable manner, neither state would gain the maximized 
benefits of victory through conflict.  Simultaneously, neither side would risk losing 
everything through defeat in war, and both can avoid the costs of unnecessary conflict.34 
According to spiral theorists, the psychological biases of people hamper their 
ability to see when another group of people is different from what they believe them to be 
like.  If Country A believes Country B to be aggressive, “behavior that others might see 
as neutral or friendly will be ignored, distorted, or seen as attempted duplicity.  This 
cognitive rigidity reinforces the consequences of international anarchy.”  Jervis adds to 
the argument that states do not apply this same reasoning to their own behavior.  Even 
though Country A is arming itself with better weapons, Country A knows that such 
weaponry is for defensive purposes and sees itself as a peaceful country, not realizing 
that Country B and possibly other countries see the arming of Country A as threatening.35 
The psychological biases that leaders and peoples have of others and themselves 
leads to Jervis’s root understanding of the perceptions and misperceptions that result in 
international conflict.36  Inherent biases of the defender against the adversary will prod 
the defender to expect a certain type of reaction even before the initial action occurs.  
Pre-conclusions about how the adversary will behave lead the defender to a policy that 
buttresses its own position, thereby forcing the adversary to react in a possibly hostile 
manner.  Jervis states, “If the prophecy of hostility is thoroughly self-fulfilling, the belief 
that there is a high degree of real conflict will create a conflict that is no longer illusory.  
Overtures that earlier would have decreased tensions and cleared up misunderstandings 
will now be taken as signs of weakness.”37  Whether deterrence successfully prevents 
                                                 
34 Jervis, p. 67. 
35 Ibid., pp. 68-70. 
36 Ibid., p. 75. 
37 Ibid., p. 77.  
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conflict or whether misunderstandings result in spiral escalation, perceptions and 
misperceptions of state leaders call into question when force or threat of force is useful to 
ensure the security of the state remains strong in international anarchy. 
3. Glaser’s Expansion of Jervis 
Glaser, using the distinction between the deterrence and spiral models as the 
underpinnings of his argument, proposes a more in-depth method of analysis. He finds 
that the two models are “a valuable starting point but they are ultimately inadequate and 
confusing.”38  Glaser begins by “reformulating” the different types of adversaries 
according to different motivations for why an adversary might want to expand its 
boundaries and thereby infringe upon another state.  He next details the different levels of 
misperception that a state and its leaders might have concerning the disposition of its 
adversary.  Glaser analyzes the influences that the misperceptions might have on the 
resulting state policy and actions.  He focuses upon how military actions on the part of 
the defender interact with the domestic politics of the adversary.  Depending upon how 
the political consequences play out in the domestic struggles within the adversary, the 
security dilemma of the defender could be heightened or lessened by the political 
reactions within the adversary. 
C. TYPES OF ADVERSARY 
In contrast to Jervis, Glaser categorizes a state’s reasons for expansion not 
according to its intentions, but rather according to its motives.  Where Jervis would focus 
solely on whether a state is expansionist in practice, Glaser attempts to determine the 
motives for why a state acts in ways that appear expansionist.    Glaser writes, “In broad 
terms, a state’s motives for expansion can be categorized as either non-security driven or 
security driven.”  A state will pursue non-security expansion “to increase its wealth, 
territory, and/or prestige, to spread its ideology, and so forth” even though such actions 
are not necessary to enhance the state’s security.  Those states that are willing to risk 
relatively high costs to pursue non-security expansion are categorized as greedy.  Those 
states not willing to risk suffering losses in the pursuit of non-security expansion are 
categorized as not greedy.39 
                                                 
38 Glaser, p. 499. 
39 Ibid., p. 501. 
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For those states that seek expansion for security reasons, Glaser categorizes them 
as either potentially insecure or as always secure in regards to having the military 
capabilities to defend the status quo. The “security” of the adversary state is measured in 
its confidence that the military can defend its possessions and interests.40  Russia would 
be construed as always secure if it is confident that Ukraine does not harbor any designs 
to exceed beyond its present boundaries.  Additionally, the same always-secure label 
would apply if Russia is confident that its military forces could defeat any future military 
intrusions on part of Ukraine and thereby maintain its domestic political structure. To 
avoid the security dilemma, it is important that both the defender and the adversary must 
be able to effectively evaluate the intentions and capabilities of the other.  A strong 
capability to accurately assess the other’s intentions is key to being able to alleviate the 
security dilemma.  A weak capability allows for unintended political and military 
decisions that exacerbate the security dilemma. 
 According to Glaser, the basic deterrence and spiral models account for only 
secure greedy states and insecure not-greedy states, respectively.  However, because 
Glaser redefines the motivations and capabilities of states, four different adversaries are 
specified.  With each type of adversary identified, the defender can anticipate the possible 
political consequences of different strategies and determine which strategy will have the 
desired effect on the adversary.41  See Table 1 for graphic representation of which model 
fits different motivations and capabilities. 
 
Table 1.   Types of Adversaries42 
 Greedy Not-Greedy 
Always-Secure Deterrence Model Ideal State 
Potentially Insecure Doubly Difficult Spiral Model 
 
 
                                                 
40 Glaser, p. 502. 
41 Ibid. p. 503. 
42 Ibid. 
23 
1. Always-Secure Greedy Adversary 
The defender that confronts an always-secure greedy adversary should pursue 
two political results.  First, the defender must “communicate resolve to protect its 
interests.”  If the defender fails to show such determination, the adversary could perceive 
weakness on part of the defender and encourage military aggression.  Second, the 
defender should “pursue policies that might reduce the adversary’s greediness.”  If the 
ruling party of the adversary is intransigent in its aggressive behavior, the defender can 
support policies and actions that can shift the domestic balance of power within the 
adversary by supporting those parties, elites, or forces that favor the status quo and 
moderation.43 
Hypothetically, if Russia were an always-secure greedy adversary, Ukraine, from 
the beginning, must show to Moscow a strong determination that non-security expansion 
at Ukraine’s expense could result in a costly war.  Secondly, Ukraine could cultivate anti-
imperial or anti-expansionist sentiment within Russia proper in order to persuade 
Moscow that non-security expansion against Ukraine could result in domestic political 
upheaval in Russia. 
2. Potentially Insecure Not-Greedy Adversary 
The defender should choose policies that tend to diminish the other side’s 
insecurity.  If the adversary is not posing a threat to the interests and borders of the 
defender, then the defender should take actions that solidify those non-threatening 
policies and the domestic actors in the adversary who support such policies.  If the non-
threatening ruling forces of the adversary are insecure in their power, they may 
incorrectly determine that the defender poses a threat to their state’s security.  Because of 
this insecurity, the defender needs to reassure the adversary of its non-aggressive 
intentions.  Policies and decisions of the defender that directly diminish any perceived 
threat to the adversary could help lessen the adversary’s insecurity.  When taking such 
unilateral steps, the defender must ensure that such steps are not too drastic to invite 
aggression from a newly emboldened and strengthened adversary.44 
                                                 
43 Ibid., p. 504. 
44 Ibid. 
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If the rulers of Russia showed no designs of encroachment upon any of Ukraine’s 
vital interests but were intimidated by Ukraine’s international allies and strength to such a 
degree that they feared Russia’s international standing was challenged by Ukraine’s 
activities, Russia would be classified as a potentially insecure not-greedy adversary.  
Ukraine should then promote the survivability of the benign Russian rulers by making 
conciliatory moves that allow Russians to stabilize their own power. 
3. Insecure Greedy Adversary 
In the most dangerous scenario facing the defender, the insecure greedy adversary 
challenges the defender with two conditions that simultaneously magnify the severity of 
the other.  To such an adversary, the potential gains of waging total war “equal the 
benefits of non-security expansion plus the benefits of increased security.”  If the leader 
of an insecure greedy state increases his military capabilities for future non-security 
expansion, the defender must, in turn, increase his military capabilities to counter the 
adversary.  The adversary however points to the defender’s force escalation and presents 
it as proof that the adversary is correct in its position, which thus reinforces the 
adversary’s insecurity.45  The presence of two bedeviling conditions causes the most 
concern of the four types of adversaries.  Conciliatory efforts on part of the defender 
allows the “greedy adversary” to see weakness in the defender.  A logical armed response 
by the defender causes greater anxiety for the “insecure adversary” and thus, continued 
escalation.  The best strategy is therefore likely to be a careful, mixed strategy that offers 
reassurance but also demonstrates resolve. 
4. Always Secure Not-Greedy Adversary 
The most stable and non-threatening of the four adversaries, most states would 
classify “this type of state as an ally or friend.”  Political and military actions by the 
defender should promote the goodwill and foster the mutual understanding of each.  
Throughout the relationship, open communication between both states is key, especially 
when the defender may make escalatory military actions against a third state.  The 
adversary (or ally in this case) must be well informed about the defender’s need to 
increase its military posture.46 
                                                 
45 Ibid., p. 505. 
46 Ibid. 
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D. IMPLICATIONS OF MILITARY POLICIES AND MISPERCEPTIONS 
Glaser further categorizes the four different adversaries with another distinction, 
whether or not the adversary is clear-sighted or myopic in understanding the defender’s 
military policies.47  If the adversary is clear-sighted, it will correctly comprehend the 
actions of the defender and react accordingly.  If the adversary is myopic, it will 
incorrectly assess the defender’s actions and usually interpret those actions in the most 
negative and threatening light.  In explaining the clear-sighted adversary, Glaser must set 
aside the implications of the security dilemma.  He details what the political and military 
responses could be if the adversary fully understood the defender’s military decisions. 
But acknowledging the usual existence of the security dilemma, especially when 
there are competing domestic and international challenges upon the defender and the 
adversary, Glaser explains the implications of the dilemma and suggests valid responses 
to ameliorate the confusion. He analyzes what the defender’s military policies should be 
if the adversary is not able to effectively ascertain the true meaning of the defender’s 
actions. 
Glaser separates military actions of the defender along two dimensions: offensive 
or defensive and unilateral or bilateral.  The terminology used for “offensive” and 
“defensive” applies not only to the military actions that the defender takes but also what 
types of forces are acquired.  Glaser uses the term “bilateral” to “refer to policies in 
which the defender uses arms control to achieve the objectives of its military policy.  
Bilateral policies do not [emphasis added] include alliances made by the defender to 
balance against the adversary; such alliance would be part of a unilateral policy.” For an 
overall classification of great importance to the thesis, Glaser determines that “military 
policies that are offensive and unilateral are generally considered more competitive, 
whereas those that are defensive and rely on arms control are usually viewed as more 
cooperative.”48 
The defender’s possible decisions toward the adversary, whether they are 
cooperative or competitive, will help determine the severity of the security dilemma in 
                                                 
47 Ibid., p. 511. 
48 Ibid., p. 508. 
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which the defender and the adversary find themselves.  The security dilemma decreases 
when the actions of the defender become clearer to the adversary since the adversary 
understands the reasons for the defender’s military policy.  The dilemma also decreases 
“as the effectiveness of offense declines relative to defense.”  In the converse situation, 
when the “offense/defense balance favors offense, the defender may be unable to afford 
defensive capabilities; an offensive strategy, however, threatens the adversary’s 
capability to protect itself and therefore risks decreasing the adversary’s security.”49 
The distinction between clear-sightedness and myopia is vitally important to 
understanding the complex inter-relationships of the domestic players in Ukraine and 
Russia.  If Ukraine acts to improve its own defenses against foreign attack by any state by 
deploying more policemen for border security, the ruling elite in Moscow could interpret 
such an act as reasonable and accept Ukraine’s act on its face value.  However, to other 
domestic players in Russia, possibly the ultra-nationalists or the military, the act of Kiev 
deploying “soldiers to the Russian border” could be interpreted as aggressive and 
escalatory.  Depending upon the strength of the ultra-nationalists or the military 
bureaucracy in Russia and their ability to influence Moscow’s decisions, Ukraine, by 
deploying internal security guards to its borders, could be inadvertently increasing its 
own security dilemma. 
   
1. Clear-Sighted Adversary 
Despite having the security dilemma alleviated, the defender will still take actions 
to improve its security.  When confronting a clear-sighted secure greedy adversary, the 
defender must show that it can defend its interests and is resolute in its actions.  Since the 
adversary can glean the truth concerning the defender’s capabilities, it can also determine 
whether or not the defender’s deterrence capabilities are valid, thus the defender must 
solidify its credibility at every turn.  If the adversary doubts the defender’s will to act in 
its own defense, the adversary could exploit the defender’s lack of resolve.  Arms control 
activities designed to lessen the threat of escalation would not weaken the defender’s 
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resolve in the eyes of the adversary, as long as the force reductions did not jeopardize the 
defender’s ability to protect itself.50 
If the defender were to confront a clear-sighted potentially insecure not-greedy 
adversary, the best policies are defensive.  Arms control is useful when it leads the 
adversary to shift to a defensive posture, but arms control, by itself, holds no particular 
advantage over unilateral actions if those can persuade the adversary to pursue a 
defensive posture as well.  The defender should avoid optional offense capabilities (those 
military capabilities that are above and beyond the required necessary offense capabilities 
and thereby endanger the interests of the insecure adversary) but must maintain the 
necessary offense capabilities to stave off any unforeseen acts of aggression and to 
defend the status quo.  Because the line between optional offense and necessary offense is 
hard to define, to prevent the adversary form deriving “ambiguities” and “malign 
objectives,” the defender should emphasize its defense capabilities.51 
The defender should pursue defensive policies when it is faced with a clear-
sighted insecure greedy adversary.  By choosing defensive policies, the defender satisfies 
the requirements to meet clear-sighted insecure states as well as clear-sighted greedy 
states at the same time.  The former requires defensive strategies, while against the latter 
the choice matters not -- either defensive or offensive strategies will suffice against the 
greedy adversary.52 
2. Myopic Adversary 
If the adversary, for any reason, is unable to correctly judge the intentions of the 
defender, the propensity for misperception greatly increases and with it comes an 
exaggeration of the security dilemma.  Misperceptions on the part of a state could be due 
to either national-level analytical capabilities or individual-level cognitive capabilities.53  
The spiral model of Jervis relies heavily on the psychological inability of leaders to 
correctly assess the true nature of an adversary.  Rather than individual inabilities, Glaser 
explains the negative ramifications that weak state institutions have in helping the state 
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make informed decisions regarding the actions and inclinations of another state.  He 
acknowledges that individuals can bring biases to the decision-making process, but 
Glaser finds the larger fault in organizations and bureaucracies whose responsibility is to 
correctly assess the threat. 
Included in a country’s national-level evaluative capability 
are organizations dedicated to analyzing military and 
foreign policy – analytic units within the government, think 
tanks, and universities.  Of course, the overall quality of a 
country’s evaluation depends on the quality of the analysis 
produced by these organizations, but it also depends on the 
quality of debate both within the government and in the 
public arena.  If certain organizations are able to gain 
undue influence because of their power, prestige, 
bargaining skill, and/or public relations skill, the country’s 
evaluation of opposing states will tend to be biased.54 
To contest national-level misperceptions by the adversary, the defender must 
remain aware of the adversary’s possible biases in future interactions.  The defender 
should “expect misperceptions to be far more common than if they derived solely from 
cognitive failures.”  If a Russian government bureaucracy, due to institutionalized bias, 
misperceived the intentions of Ukraine in 2001, it should be expected that, without any 
changes to the same bureaucracy, similar biases would surface in 2002.  The defender 
should also look at “other indicators of misperception”, such as “public debate and the 
vitality and diversity of its analytic units.”  And, if possible, the defender should also 
adopt policies that better the adversary’s national-level evaluative capabilities.  These 
opportunities, though rare in occurrence, could present themselves as low and mid-level 
diplomatic and military exchanges and other confidence-building measures.55 
Compared to interactions with a clear-sighted adversary, the defender’s military 
policy towards a myopic adversary can have quite different effects because 
“misperceptions can intensify undesirable political consequences and narrow, or even 
eliminate, the defender’s options for avoiding them.”56 
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The defender, when faced by a myopic secure greedy adversary, will have to 
pursue a more competitive policy.  A lack-luster defense, in the eyes of the adversary, 
might encourage the adversary to strike for non-security gains against the defender.  The 
defender’s resolve must be strong and its leaders vigilant.  If there is any doubt about the 
defender’s resolve, the adversary will challenge it.  For this reason, “the defender should 
over invest in military capabilities, deploying forces beyond those reasonably required by 
strictly military assessments.”  Such military capabilities may also favor the offense, 
since the defender must show that it is capable of making the adversary pay for any 
aggressive mistakes. The defender must also avoid arms control policies since such 
actions will be construed as concessions to the greedy adversary.57 
When a myopic insecure not-greedy adversary confronts the defender, the case 
favors cooperation while making competitive actions more risky.  Whether the source of 
misperception comes from psychological or national-level failures, “the result is that the 
adversary is likely to infer that the threats to its capabilities reflect the defender’s malign 
intentions rather than the defender’s lack of acceptable, less threatening options.”  
Because of the inability of the adversary to see the legitimate need of offense by the 
defender, the adversary’s sense of insecurity is heightened.  To lessen the risk, the 
defender should, if possible, shift to a more defensive posture.  Simultaneously, the 
defender “might use arms control to reduce misperceptions by providing a forum for 
directly communicating beliefs about military doctrine and force requirements, the 
threatening nature of the adversary’s forces, and its own willingness to make 
compromises and exercise restraint.”58 
The final type of adversary that the defender encounters (not including an ally) is 
the myopic insecure greedy state, which Glaser determines is the most difficult to 
manage.  Myopic greedy states require competitive policies while myopic insecure states 
require cooperative remedies, so balancing the two extremes is the difficulty.  The 
defender must measure how much the security dilemma is affecting the responses of the 
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adversary and whether the adversary is more focused upon non-security expansion or 
security.59 
One method of confronting a myopic insecure greedy state includes the 
acquisition and deployment of forces in a robust defense, i.e. defense emphasis.  The 
defender unilaterally over invests in defensive capabilities.  This defender takes this 
position even if it costs more than deploying offensive capabilities.60  To deter the 
adversary, the defender should outspend the adversary, acquiring more than the defensive 
capabilities necessary to render the adversary’s offensive capabilities as moot.61  Such 
over-spending on the defense could persuade the adversary to shift positions and assume 
a defense strategy and forego the offense.  Glaser writes “the defender’s defense 
emphasis encourages such a shift if it (1) corrects the adversary’s leaders’ misperceptions 
of the defender’s hostility; and/or (2) reduces the political power of hard-liners within the 
adversary’s government.”  The “beyond necessary” defense spending is effective only to 
a point, as the defender cannot indefinitely over-spend on defense.62 
Another method that supports the defensive strategy is arms control, especially 
when the measure is bilateral as well as verifiable and the process comes with risk.  With 
effective arms control, both the defender and the adversary “gain” in respect to each 
designating fewer assets for the defense or the offense.63  Prior to either side agreeing to 
the measure, the greedy adversary must be deterred.  If the defender wants to move from 
unilateral defensive strategy to arms control, it must go to the bargaining table with 
bargaining chips, which requires the defender to acquire offensive capabilities.  This 
acquisition of offensive capabilities to be used solely for barter could foment the 
adversary’s misperceptions of the defender’s intent.64 
Unilateral restraint is the third major method of effective defensive strategy.  “By 
reducing its ability to defend itself, the defender also reduces the threat it poses to the 
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adversary.”  This method is particularly desirable when offense and defense capabilities 
are indistinguishable and a greater or lesser mixture of either does not reduce the 
adversary’s insecurity.  The defender accepts larger risks through unilateral restraint, 
more so than with defense emphasis and arms control as the latter two allow the defender 
to reduce the insecurity of the adversary without severely hampering its ability to defend 
itself.65 
The final method of handling a myopic insecure greedy state is competitive rather 
than cooperative.  The option of reactive offense allows the defender to initially pursue a 
defensive strategy.  However it maintains a reserve capability that allows the defender to 
shift to offense if the adversary intrudes upon the initial defensive stance.  “A minimally 
successful policy of reactive offense teaches the adversary the futility of pursuing 
offense; in more successful cases, the adversary’s leaders infer that the defender lacks 
malign intentions, and/or the defender’s reactive policy defeats adversary hard-liners.”66 
E. SNYDER ON THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL FACTORS 
AFFECTING DOMESTIC REGIMES 
During the Cold War, the relationship between the United States and the Soviet 
Union determined the international situation.  In their political and military dealings, the 
two superpowers responded mainly to each other or their own internal factors, while third 
parties had lesser influence.  The relationship between Ukraine and Russia however, 
though both are great states in their own standing, does not rival the Cold War in 
magnitude.  Taken together, both states are part of the international community and are 
affected, to varying degrees, by the amount of support or nonsupport that is derived from 
international factors.  Because Glaser did not examine domestic-international interactions 
in detail in his model, the thesis incorporates three of Snyder’s conditions that affect 
domestic institutions and actors: whether international conditions favor the ruling regime 
or other domestic actors, the intentions of the domestic regime, and the strength the 
regime.67 
1. International Conditions: Threats or Inducements for International 
Cooperation 
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Because the Cold War revolved around two superpowers that both adhered to 
different economic systems, the interplay of international economic factors was not as 
prevalent as it is today.  Since the capitalistic United States was the economic and 
military hegemonic power of the West, it was also the backbone of the international 
economic institutions.  The Soviet Union was the same power in the East, imposing a 
command economy, and it largely closed itself off from international economic forces 
and choked upon its inefficiencies. 
The demise of the Soviet structure has exposed both Russia and Ukraine to the 
economic and diplomatic forces of the West.  Since the West and its ideology won the 
Cold War, the economically weak states of the former Soviet Union have incorporated 
certain practices and policies to encourage Western investment.  The rule of law, market 
reforms, banking reforms, constitutional adherence, voting reforms, anti-corruption 
measures, and press freedoms are just a few of the litany of changes that both states have 
been encouraged to adhere to and promote.  Significant failures in one or several such 
reforms can severely curtail Western support of the offending country.  Since the United 
States continues to dominate the international economic factors, the thesis will factor in 
how those influences constrain or motivate domestic actors within Ukraine and Russia. 
2. Domestic Regime: Liberal or Imperial Policies 
Depending upon the intent and the actions of a domestic ruling condition, Snyder 
describes the regime as an adherent to either liberal or imperial policies.  A regime with a 
liberal orientation has “an electoral democracy with a foreign policy oriented toward 
mutually beneficial trade with other great powers.”  An imperial regime maintains “an 
elite coalition formed by groups with expansionist, protectionist, or militaristic interests, 
pursuing a foreign policy based primarily on coercion and conquest.”68  The international 
reaction to a ruling coalition’s policies can affect, either positively or negatively, that 
coalition’s domestic standing.  Since the United States and its economic benefactors 
prefer stability within the international arena, any state that threatens to create instability 
within another peaceful state causes consternation and concern.  Such apprehension and 
conflict can lead to the disruption of trade, the divestiture of assets, and a withdrawal of 
international support and funding, which could undermine a regime’s domestic support. 
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Both Russia and Ukraine say they have embraced democratic ideals and, to this 
day, are continually attempting to define and refine them to suit their national 
understandings and historical traditions.  Some Russian political entities, however, desire 
to return to an imperial past, but any move in such a direction would be highly 
discouraged by the international community as well as the Western powers.  The United 
States greatly prefers both states to further adopt liberal regimes and to take the necessary 
acts to firmly cement the democratic ideals within their societies.  As a result, the United 
States and the West would more readily offer support to the liberal-leaning coalitions as 
opposed to the imperial state. 
3. Domestic Regime and Policies: Strong or Weak Institutionalization 
The relative strength or weakness of the domestic regime also determines the 
degree of influence that international factors have on the domestic political system.  The 
more the state has experienced and incorporated liberal practices over time into its 
institutions, the better the chance that the domestic regime is able to promote liberal 
international trade policies.  An effective governmental policy exists when all participants 
contributing to the policy understand the rules and allowances of the policy, including the 
rules of an established market economy. 
If the regime, though liberal in its current intentions, has recently moved from 
long-standing imperial policies, the regime will be weak until it can practice its national 
intentions in a routine manner.  Until all major actors in the regime accept its institutions 
and act according to the laws, the regime will be weak.  The weak regime will need to 
reform itself or gain support from another regime willing to expend capital on the regime 
until it can institutionalize the right practices, or else the regime will fail in its liberalizing 
intentions and revert to another type of regime, usually a military dictatorship or an 
autocracy. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Glaser concludes by stating that the future of Europe and its desire to share 
continual “good relations” would be better served in a system “in which all the major 
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powers emphasize defensive capabilities.”69  His argument posits “the defender should 
usually pursue cooperative policies when moderates are in power [of the adversary].  The 
choice is less clear-cut when hard-liners are in power: the key issue is which 
interpretation of the defender’s motivations will prevail in the adversary’s debate.  Is the 
defender reacting to the hard-liner’s provocation or simply pursuing threatening policies 
that reflect malign intentions?”70 
This chapter has extracted the pertinent points of Glaser’s model detailing the 
political ramifications of military actions upon different adversaries.  Table 2 summarizes 
the responses that the defender should employ depending upon which type of adversary it 
faces.  However, since the model did not adequately discuss the effects of international 
factors upon the domestic actors, the chapter also infused three factors discussed by 
Snyder that can have significant bearing upon any implementation of policy of change 
within the domestic structure in the Ukraine (the defender) or in Russia (the adversary).  
The thesis will apply the model to Russia at the end of the third chapter wherein it 
attempts to identify what type of adversary President Putin’s government presents 
Ukraine.  The end of the third chapter also explains what type of adversaries the domestic 
challengers to Putin could be and whether or not such a shift in power could possibly help 
or hinder Ukrainian security. 
In this chapter, the thesis assembled a theoretical framework that stipulates how a 
defender’s actions can have either positive or negative effects on its adversary.  As 
Ukraine approaches national decisions that tread on Russian interests, the Ukrainian 
leaders should answer five questions concerning Russia and the Russian leaders.  Is the 
Russian leadership content in its present confines of state or is the Russian leadership 
looking for ways to increase its territorial holdings or economic status at the expense of 
Ukraine?  Is the Russian leadership secure in its ability to defend the Russian state status 
quo from any perceived hostile threats from Ukraine?  Is the Russian ruling elite able to 
adequately discern the strengths and weaknesses of Ukraine or is it myopic in its view, 
allowing single issues to cloud its opinion, and thereby fouling its decision-making 
process?  Is the Russian leadership domestically empowered so that it can effect its 
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national decisions and international agreements while weathering domestically unpopular 
decisions without fearing losing power to its political opponents?  And finally, Ukraine 
must determine that if it does not like the present rulers in Moscow, are the alternatives 
any more conducive to Ukrainian interests? 
 
Table 2.   Basic Policies for Managing Different Types of Adversaries71 
 Clear-Sighted Myopic 
Always-Secure Greedy 
No general preference for cooperation 
over competition 
Over-invest in military 
capabilities 
--often favors offense 
Potentially Insecure Greedy 
Prefer Defense 
--“necessary offense” reduces security but 
does not communicate malign intent 
--“optional offense” communicates malign 
intent 
--reactive offense is a partial exception 
Arms control useful primarily for shifting 
to defense 
Strongly prefer defense 
--even “necessary offense” 
communicates malign intent 
--reactive offense unlikely to 
succeed 
Arms control may be useful 
for reducing misperceptions 
 
 
Potentially Insecure Not 
Greedy 
Prefer defense; it lies in the intersection of 
policies for secure greedy and insecure 
not-greedy states 
Over-invest in defense 
Engage in arms control only 
with great caution  
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III. SHARED HISTORY OF UKRAINE AND RUSSIA 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Ukraine cannot be understood in isolation from Russia, but, 
by the same token, Russia cannot be understood in isolation 
from Ukraine.  The two countries define each other in a 
way that few others do.  The historical interconnections 
between Ukraine and Russia have penetrated every aspect 
of the current relationship.  Their relations are therefore 
complex and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable 
future.72 
The present conditions of states do not exist in a vacuum.  The international and 
domestic situations of nations are the result of past interactions of peoples within defined 
territories.  Because any state’s present status reflects its history, present and future 
decisions of state political elites can be estimated to follow certain paths.  If in the near 
and distant past a nation-state was constantly aggressed against by a dominant 
neighboring state without negative consequences for the aggressor, the aggressed should 
infer that the future would proceed in similar fashion to the past if there were no change 
in the political elites within the aggressor state. 
Though both Ukraine and Russia labored over seventy years under the yoke of the 
Soviet Union, the two states and domestic parties within each view the past through 
separate eyepieces.  Differing historical understandings, coupled with present-day 
domestic and international influences on the Ukrainian and Russian people, contribute to 
the strong possibility of differing policies in the future.  Each country has different 
leaders and political elites who envision certain directions for their respective nations.  
When Ukrainian and Russian leaders embark upon a certain policy, they will have made 
the decision based upon two important assumptions of this thesis: 1) leaders want to stay 
in power and 2) staying in power requires that leaders improve the strength and security 
of their state. 
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To assess what those possible outcomes could be, this chapter reviews the 
significant historical events that heavily influence the political, social, and demographic 
interests of Ukrainian and Russian polities. 
B. HISTORICAL TIES 
Nowhere is the adage “The victors write the history” more appropriate than in 
describing the historical record of Ukraine and Russia.  With Russia being able to subdue 
Ukraine for much of the imperial and Soviet past, official Russian and then Soviet 
historians downplayed the historical significance of non-Russian nationalities.  
Predominant Russian history claims a shifting political center of gravity that started in the 
mid-Ninth Century in Kiev, migrated north through Suzdal, progressed to Moscow, and 
then to St. Petersburg73 (the Soviets again moved it back to Moscow).  The tsars 
fashioned this history to emphasize the need for the greater empire.  The Soviets adopted 
the same timeline and technique but for a different reason – to support the “Marxist 
theory of socio-historical formations (slave-owning society, feudalism, capitalism, 
socialism, communism).”74 
As events occur, different interpretations of the same events continue to shape the 
perceptions and prejudices of both Ukrainians and Russians.  As Andrew Wilson notes 
“modern Ukrainian historians risk further polarizing contemporary politics by inverting 
the traditional Russian-Soviet historical schema and emphasizing a history of conflict 
rather than cooperation.”75  Anatol Lieven points out that the current official historians of 
both Russia and Ukraine were formerly employed as Soviet historians. These nationalist 
historians were “not only cut off from new international currents of historical thought, but 
in many cases they are quite simply accustomed to both preaching state dogma and 
making the search for and criticism of ‘enemies of socialism’ (or today, of the nation) an 
essential part of their work.”76 
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Many Western historians have “by and large, adopted either the traditional pre-
1917 Russian scheme or the Soviet version of Russian history” that there is a “oneness of 
the Slavic East European people” since the middle ages.77  This inclination to accept 
Ukrainian-Russian “oneness” may prevent many nations from exploring possible policies 
for promoting a separate and independent Ukraine and Russia.  However, many 
Ukrainian and non-Russian historians highlight the inaccuracies of the widely held 
interpretation that there is a common Eastern Slav culture, and argue that there is a 
distinct Ukrainian culture and people, as well as Byelorussian, separate and apart from 
the Great Russians.78  It is not the intent of this thesis to determine which school of 
thought is more true nor who is the rightful descendent of the Kievan Rus; rather, the 
historiographical rift is exposed because vocal nationalists in both countries claim an 
inheritance to their past and thereby demand territorial establishments congruent with 
their understanding of the past. 
1. Pre-Soviet History 
Though the years of Soviet rule provide the greatest grievances to Ukrainians, 
many problems reflect conditions and events that arose prior to the establishment of the 
Soviet Union in 1922.  Questions concerning the legacy of the Kievan Rus divide 
nationalists of both countries to the core.  Though many within the political arena 
consider any dispute concerning the “exclusive possession” as inconsequential, there are 
others who do not.  Both Russian and Ukrainian nationalists emphatically argue their 
respective positions since they both base the legitimacy of their being on the merits of 
their argument. 
Ukrainian nationalists, seeing a need to establish distinct “ideological and 
historiographical bases of their statehood,” argue that the present-day Ukrainians are in a 
direct line from the “ethnic and cultural tradition in the old Kievan Rus heartland, and 
that the Russians of Muscovy by contrast are mainly descended from Finno-Ugric tribes.”  
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The Ukrainian nationalists further dismiss Russian culture, dominated in the northern 
principalities of Suzdal, Vladimir, and Moscow by the Mongols, as ‘Asiatized.’”79  To 
comprehend the arguments of the nationalists, a brief review of Ukrainian – Russian 
history is in order. 
In 878, Oleg, the Varangian80 prince of Novgorod seized control of Kiev and 
ruled until 912.  The lands under his rule were known as the “Rus” from which the 
Varangians “led their Slavic vassals in attacks on the Byzantines and wars against the 
Turkish nomads of the eastern and southern steppes.” During the rule of Vladimir (980-
1015), the domain converted from paganism to Orthodox Christianity.  The Orthodox 
Metropolitanate of Kiev formed in 1037, during which the reign of Kiev ruled over the 
territory now known as Ukraine, Belarus, and European Russia.  The Eleventh Century 
saw the gradual disintegration of Kievan rule as feuds between city-states emerged.  
Continued weakness led to the 1240 Mongol defeat, which resulted in the all regions, 
minus the western Galicia and Volhynia, being subjugated as vassals to the Mongols.81 
In 1244, the independent western kingdom Galicia-Volhynia reached its apex in 
power.  In 1299, the Metropolitan of Kiev left the city and settled in the principality of 
Vladimir near present-day Moscow.  With this departure, “Kiev’s religious and cultural 
supremacy over Rus drew to a close.”  Over the course of the next century, Poland 
annexed Galicia while Lithuania annexed Volhynia.  In 1362, Lithuania defeated the 
Mongols and assumed control over most of what is now Ukraine.  In 1471, Muscovite 
forces defeated the independent city-state of Novgorod.  The Sixteenth Century saw Tsar 
Ivan IV (Ivan the Terrible) conquer Kazan and Astrakhan as the eastern expansion of 
Muscovy began.  Catholic and Orthodoxy forces bound themselves together as Lithuania 
and Poland agreed to the Union of Brest in 1596.  Under the term “Uniates,” the two 
sides adopted an arrangement in which the Orthodox “accepted the supremacy of the 
pope while retaining their own liturgy and traditions.”  The first half of the Seventeenth 
Century saw Orthodox Cossacks revolt against Polish rule and the Uniates from the west.  
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The rebellions led to the rise of the Cossack leader Hetman Bogdan Khmelnitsky, who 
defeated the Poles in 1648, and in 1649, entered Kiev victorious and proclaimed a new 
Rus state.  During the next decade, the Polish armies returned in strength, forcing 
Khmelnitsky to seek protection from the Poles by aligning his reign with the Romanov 
family ruling from Moscow under the Treaty of Pereiaslav in 1654.82 
The import and meaning of the Treaty of Pereiaslav in 1654, with its lasting 
effects, continues today to drive wedges between the nationalistic forces of Ukraine and 
Russia.  As Khmelnitsky swore allegiance to Tsar Alexei, the tsar changed his title from 
“Tsar of All Rus” to “Tsar of All Great and Little Rus.”  Eventually the term “Little Rus” 
acquired a negative connotation.  Lieven illustrates one scenario wherein Ukrainian 
national individuality is lost. 
The Russian Empire, which had succeeded the tsardom of 
Muscovy had replaced the ancient word “Rus” with a new 
one “Rossiya,” or Russia, and designated Ukraine (not then 
generally called Ukraine) as not Malaya [Little] Rus, but 
Malaya Rossiya.  From being a recognized sharer in the 
patrimony of the ancient Rus, “Ukraine” was thereby 
clearly designated a subordinate province of a new state.83 
It must be noted that the Cossack rulers gained guarantees from the tsar, ensuring “the 
rights of the Cossacks, the status of the Cossack nobility, and the freedom of Ukrainian 
towns to elect the own municipal governments.”84 
The differing opinions of the import of the Treaty of Pereiaslav are great, and not 
just between the vocal nationalists.  For the Ukrainians, the treaty was “simply a personal 
union between two states, under the rule of one monarch, but with quite separate 
administrative, judicial, educational, and even military institutions and traditions.”  When 
subsequent tsars violated the treaty as imperial rule attempted to quash most semblances 
of Ukrainian nationality, the Pereiaslav agreement itself was rendered “null and void.”85 
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To the Russians, the treaty signified Khmelnitsky’s “submission” to a destined 
“reunification of the lands of the Rus” under the rule of a single monarch.  Lieven 
postulates “the Muscovite state, with its traditions of autocracy, absolutism, and the 
complete absence of legal estates and rights, was simply incapable of grasping the notion 
of a binding contract between the monarch and a part of his people.”  It can be said that 
the same incapacity remains prevalent throughout the ruling elite of today.86  The 
subsequent years under domain of the Russian Empire resulted in continued Cossack and 
Ukrainian suppression by the throne.  As Lithuania and Poland decreased in strength, the 
power void on the western border was filled by Sweden and later Austria.  The Ukrainian 
western provinces continually dealt with the tumult of the power shifts and experienced 
more and more exposure to the European states. 
In 1689, Peter the Great ascended to the throne and bestowed upon himself the 
title “Emperor of All the Russians.”  His empire building severely impinged upon the 
steppe and the livelihood of the Cossacks.  With the 1708 defeat at Poltava at the hands 
of the Russians, the Cossacks found their autonomy greatly diminished, as the Russian 
government appointed a puppet hetman to administer the law as St. Petersburg saw fit. 
Within the next sixty years, any notion of Ukrainian autonomy was eradicated as Russia 
incorporated the Ukrainian territory.  Sloboda Ukraine fell in 1765, followed by 
Zaporozhia in 1775, and then the Hetmanate between 1781 and 1785.87  When the 
Russian troops occupied and abolished the Zaporozhian Cossack base, the last remnant of 
Ukrainian autonomy disappeared under tsarist Russia.  Concurrently, Russian serfdom 
was “introduced” to Ukraine; however, the Cossack and Ukrainian nobility became 
thoroughly integrated into the bureaucracy of the empire by 1835.88  In the middle of the 
Eighteenth Century, the Russian army also defeated the Ottoman Empire in battle and 
acquired Dnipropetrovsk, Sevastopol, and Odessa and the Southern Steppes, greatly 
increasing the lands of the Russian Empire and acquiring its long sought access to the 
Black Sea.89 
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Even though “Ukraine had been stamped with the seal of the empire” by 1796, the 
Russification of Ukraine escalated throughout the Nineteenth Century.  Two decrees 
targeted the root of Ukrainian society – the Ukrainian language, which Russia realized 
was “the primary vehicle for transmitting Ukrainian national and cultural values.”  The 
Valuev Decree, issued in 1863, prohibited the publishing of books written in Ukrainian.  
The Elms Decree of 1876 both reiterated the prohibition of printing Ukrainian books and 
precluded their importation from abroad.  It further officially “repudiated the existence of 
a Ukrainian nationality.”90  With the decree that no Ukrainian nationality even existed, 
the next logical step for Russian historiographers would to deduce that “all Eastern Slavs 
were presented as one nation – the Russian people.”91 
As the Russian Empire grew in size, it also grew in administrative weight.  The 
1905 revolution resulted in a series of reforms in Russia and in Ukraine.  Though the 
Ukrainian national movement was founded in 1840 by the nationalist poet Taras 
Shevchenko, followed by the establishment of Ukrainian cultural societies throughout the 
1850s, it was not until the 1905 revolution that nationalist sentiment could be expressed 
openly.92 
The First World War combined with internal strife and revolutionary activity 
undermined the Russian Empire and the reign of the Romanov family.  Without 
dissecting the entire period from the start of the First World War in 1914 to the Treaty of 
Union between the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics in December 1920, 
the overriding theme to the average Ukrainian was anarchy.93  The production 
capabilities and, more importantly, the distribution of grain and foodstuffs fell as the 
peasantry became less endeared to any central government and more concerned with 
supplying their staples for their families.94  Coupled with the peasant rebellions 
                                                 
settled under Russian imperial rule, many Russians of today use this historical event as the underpinnings 
to their claim of having legal rights to the peninsula and much of the territory of eastern and southern 
Ukraine. See Lieven, p. 26. 
90 Wynar, p. 4. 
91 Ibid., p. 5. 
92 Lieven, p. 24. 
93 Ibid., p. 29. 
94 Magocsi, p. 486. 
44 
demanding land reforms, any government during the tumultuous times found itself with 
minimized support from the vast majority of the country. Whether its was the Ukrainian 
Bolsheviks, Ukrainian National Republic (who garnered support from the Central Powers 
to ward off the advancing Bolsheviks) through the Brest-Litvosk Treaty, the German 
puppet Hetmanate led by the Cossack Skoropads’kyi, the second Ukrainian National 
Republic under the control of the Directory,95 any controlling party ruled the country in 
name, and not necessarily in practice, for the common peasant was too concerned for his 
own welfare. 
The results of the revolutionary period of 1917 through 1920 had its positive and 
negative effects upon Ukraine.  The negative explanation states that the Treaty of Paris 
effectively stripped Ukraine of three of its western provinces: eastern Galicia went to 
Poland, Romania assumed northern Bukovina, and Czechoslovakia garnered 
Transcarpathia.  The settlement thereby ended the national revolutionary effort to join all 
of Ukraine under an autonomous state.96  However, the positive explanation claims that 
for the first time  
After 1917, energy and sacrifice on behalf of the national 
cause burst forth, in the political, social, cultural, and 
military spheres.  And even if these efforts did not bring 
about the hoped-for independence, the revolutionary 
experience itself instilled in Ukrainians a firm sense of 
national purpose – achieved, moreover, not after several 
generations of peacetime cultural work, but in less than half 
a decade.  From such a perspective, the Ukrainian 
revolution was a remarkable success.97    
2. Soviet Policies 
With the formation of the Soviet Union on December 30, 1922, Ukraine 
“voluntarily” became a union republic and no longer an independent republic.  During 
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state-building discussions of the Party leaders, Josef Stalin proposed, “to make 
independent republics the autonomous ones within the Russian Federation.”  To counter 
Stalin, Lenin went even further and proposed that all the independent soviet republics 
were equal in their right to create a new state federation and that every union republic 
even maintained the right to secede from the federation.  Lenin’s proposal carried the day 
as Stalin chose not to challenge Lenin’s proposal.  “And it was not a coincidence since 
the dictatorship of the party, which turned the USSR into the unitary state, never was 
reflected in Soviet constitutions.”98 
Because of the established dictatorship, the Ukrainian and Russian political 
institutions (outside of the Party) suffered in their inability to establish themselves 
through the existence of the Soviet Union.  Eventually, the absence of an individual 
Russian Federation distinguishable from that of the Soviet Union was the vehicle of 
discontent that Boris Yeltsin rode in his successful effort to displace Mikhail Gorbachev 
in the early 1990s. 
At face value the 1922 “merger” of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic with 
the Soviet Union and the resulting sixty-nine years of domination presented little, if any, 
benefit to the viability of a Ukrainian nation.  Not only did the draconian economic and 
political decisions from Moscow during Soviet rule exacerbate the misery of Ukrainians, 
but these decisions also adversely affected the ordinary Russian livelihood as well, 
forcing both Ukrainian and Russian polities to seek escape from the central communist 
domination when given the opportunity in 1990 and 1991.  Both states continue to suffer 
the ill effects from a regime that demanded everything from its citizens while returning 
little to its people. 
Ironically, the trials and tribulations of the Soviet system that Ukraine endured 
“united most Ukrainian-speaking areas and established for the first time a theoretically 
and to some extent actually autonomous territorial state, called Ukraine.”  With Lenin 
and Stalin both in favor of establishing the “national” states to better serve the proletarian 
historical march of history,99 the administrative apparatus and boundaries afforded by the 
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Communist Party provided a fertile ground where nationalistic attitudes could flourish 
well beyond the Party’s intent.100 
In a similar unintended outcome, the brutal and effective methods that Stalin used 
to eradicate the Polish minority population from western Ukraine facilitated the 
independence and border arrangements in 1991 when Ukraine became independent.  
Nowhere on any of Ukraine’s borders is there less friction and turmoil despite the fact 
that the two westernmost provinces continue to be the loudest advocate for anti-Russian 
sentiment.101  If Stalin had not forcefully moved the Polish minority, would not the Poles 
expect Warsaw to resolve their differences with Kiev with a decidedly skewed outcome 
in favor of the Polish population?  Would not the Polish population in Poland today 
demand such a result?  Additionally, with the Ukrainian-Polish border settled, the 
ameliorating situation denies “Russian national imperialists” one of their core rallying 
cries -- Russia must be strong with Ukraine and Belarus to stop the traditional enemy 
from Poland.102 
During the sixty-nine year communist rule, Moscow allowed the policy of 
Ukrainianization to occur on three separate occasions: in the 1920s, during 1960s, and 
just prior to the collapse during the late-1980s.  The first two, though later retracted and 
avenged, “helped to strengthen Ukrainian identity and preserve the Ukrainian language in 
areas where it otherwise might have been supplanted by Russia.”  Moscow and Stalin 
favored the 1923 policy of Ukrainianization 
Which, they hoped, would strengthen the CP(b)U’s 
[Communist (Bolshevik) Party of Ukraine] otherwise weak 
roots in the countryside…. The result was that the CP(b)U 
adopted a program for Ukrainianization of the party 
apparatus, schools, and cultural educational organizations.  
From that moment, the CP(b)U itself helped to transform 
the Soviet republic it headed into a country that was 
Ukrainian in fact as well as in name.103 
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In 1928, Stalin launched the First Five-Year Plan, aimed at “rapid 
industrialization” that would be paid for by “nationalizing all remaining sectors of the 
economy” and the collectivization of the agriculture sector.104  The Soviet 
collectivization of farms met severe resistance by the Ukrainian kulaks who were 
performing well under the previous 1921 New Economic Policy (NEP).  However since 
the NEP was the temporary “one step backward” to get the economy going after the First 
World War, Stalin used the need to take the required “two steps forward” to assist in “his 
struggle to attain uncontested political power.”105 
Since collectivization did not proceed as well as Stalin believed that it should 
have, he initiated the kulak purge in 1929.  By March 1930, 250,000 Ukrainian kulaks 
were either shot or deported.  In 1933, Stalin, attempting to crush all manners of dispute 
emanating from Ukraine, ended Ukrainianization and ushered in the “terror famine” 
wherein there were no natural causes to the shortage of food, rather Stalin choose to 
withhold the capability to plant and harvest the food.  The famine resulted in death 
estimates of 4.5 million to 8 million people.106 
Even though many Russians and Kazakhs died in the famine, especially Cossacks 
within the Don, Kuban, and Orenburg regions, some contemporary Ukrainian nationalists 
consider the terror famine as an attempted Russian genocide against the Ukrainians.  
These nationalists seemingly ignore the fact that Ukrainians also maintained high 
positions within the Soviet government and were complicit in the Soviet actions that led 
to the deaths of many Russians as well.  Even though this opinion is in the clear minority, 
because some present members of the Ukrainian government (Ministry of Education), as 
well members of the nationalist intelligentsia, hold such views, the opinion often finds 
itself vented into the public discourse.107 
The military actions during the Second World War devastated Ukraine but the 
political maneuvers by Stalin at the conclusion of the war enlarged the country in size 
and population.  It is estimated that World War II cost the lives of 35-60 million people.  
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Of this number, the Soviet Union incurred the loss of 11 million combatants and another 
7 million civilians.  Ukraine suffered the brunt of this number: 4.1 million civilian deaths 
and another 1.4 million dead or captured.  The Soviet Union evacuated 3.9 million 
Ukrainians eastward to avoid the German onslaught and the conquering Germans 
deported another 2.2 million westward for forced labor within the Third Reich.108 
As an area of operations that saw some of the most brutal combat, Ukraine 
suffered a “scorched earth policy” by the retreating Soviets in 1941.  In 1943 and 1944, 
the Germans applied a “zone of destruction” to slow the advancing Red Army.  As a 
result, 28,000 villages and 714 cities were either fully or partially destroyed.  Kiev was 
eighty-five percent devastated and Kharkiv was left at seventy percent in ruins.  If a 
Ukrainian was not dead or captured, there was a good chance that he or she was left 
homeless as more than 19 million lost their homes.109  In addition to the human losses, 
Ukraine also endured the destruction of 16,000 enterprises, hundreds of coalmines, 
electrical power stations, dams, roads, bridges as well as massive damage and destruction 
to the collective farms and tractor stations of the agricultural sector.110 
The results of the Second World War, however, also had some beneficial impact 
for Ukraine.  With the Soviet Union among the victorious allies, Stalin pressed for land 
gains at the expense of the eastern European nations.  Poland’s borders shifted to the 
west, at the expense of Germany, allowing Ukraine to expand west into Galicia and 
Volhynia, and Bessarabia.  Ukraine also assumed the province of Transcarpathia for the 
first time after Stalin pressured Czechoslovakia. These postwar land acquisitions 
expanded Soviet Ukraine’s territory approximately one-quarter and its population by 11 
million.111  With the new population came a greater number of Poles in the minority.  
This problem was quickly resolved as Stalin had the Poles forcefully deported between 
1945 and 1947.112  Following the conclusion of the Second World War, drought provided 
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the natural causes while the collectivization policies and terror provided the man-made 
causes for a devastating famine that claimed nearly a million more Ukrainian lives. 
The remaining forty-five years under the Soviet Union ebbed and flowed for the 
people of Ukraine.  Though he had risen up through the ranks under Stalin’s tutelage, 
Khrushchev, upon becoming the General Secretary, commenced to resolve some of the 
inherent problems with the regime.  In 1953, ending the mass terror and initiating a “de-
Stalinization” program, Khrushchev permitted a “thaw” throughout the Soviet Union, 
hoping to be “the leader who would at last permit the system to realize its human and 
economic potential.  His ambition was to prepare the transition from the ‘socialism’ that 
had already been achieved to the full ‘communism’” that had been the goal of the party 
leaders since Marx.”113  Khrushchev’s agricultural reforms and increased 
industrialization goals114 caused Ukraine to “cease to be a mainly rural country.”115  
Eventually, his peers grew weary of his domestic and foreign policy failures and finally 
removed him from his post in 1964. 
Throughout his tenure and rule, Khrushchev displayed a preference for the 
Ukrainian Soviet Republic.  In 1954, as “yet another affirmation of the great fraternal 
love and trust of the Russian people for Ukraine,”116 he ceded the Crimea to Ukrainian 
Republic.  Also in 1954, the Soviet Union “celebrated” the 300-year anniversary of the 
Treaty of Pereiaslav which demonstrated the “age-old brotherly love of Ukrainians and 
Russians and exemplified the general Marxist-Leninist proletarian principle of 
‘friendship among peoples.’”117  The Crimean decision continues to haunt the Russian 
nationalists and is one of their focal grievances. 
From 1963 until 1972, a second iteration of Ukrainianization policy prospered 
under the governance of Petro Shelest, First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party.  
It too was later reversed as Brezhnev ended the “de-Stalinization” policy, as evidenced in 
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Prague in 1968.  Four years later, when Brezhnev installed Volodymyr Shcherbytsky in 
Shelest’s stead, Russification was reinstated in Ukraine with a vengeance and remained 
in effect until 1989.  A return of the official policy of Russification, wherein the official 
use of the Ukrainian language was prohibited, attempted to extinguish all thought of an 
independent Ukraine -- however the seed had been planted. 
The legacy of the central economic plan, illustrated by the industrialization efforts 
and the collectivization, continues to hamper both nations in their moves away from 
communism and toward market economies.  Under the Soviet system, the extensive 
orientation of production (for production sake) required ever-increasing amounts of 
material resources and labor force.  The production quotas required the production 
managers to ignore the environmental hazards, resulting in the waste of natural resources 
and a pollution level ten times more extensive than the USSR as a whole.  After the 
explosion of the fourth power unit of Chernobyl nuclear power plant in April 1986, 
ecological conditions in the republic grew worse.  Moscow’s mishandling of Ukrainian 
interests, culminating in the 1986 nuclear mishap at Chernobyl, enhanced the stature and 
voice of those who advocated independence from the Soviet Union.118 
With the development of the system crisis, the state 
actively used the principle of “price scissors” when the 
lion’s share of the income of collective and state farms 
come to the state budget.  The agriculture more and more 
lagged behind while the flow of those who left villages still 
increased.  In 1960, the peasants composed a half of the 
population of Ukraine, while in 1985 only a third.  It 
proved impossible to feed the two-thirds of town-dwellers 
under the labor productivity of those times.  So the food 
supply problem got worse year after year.119 
As the central planning system demanded increasing production, especially from 
the military-industrial complex that was in Ukraine, the capabilities to do so became 
fewer and less productive.  The “military-industrial complex exhausted the national 
economy” as a “necessity to keep to parity in arms with the western countries brought the 
Soviet Union to the economic abyss.”  “Thousands of billions of ‘petrol dollars’ earned 
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during the world petroleum crisis of the 1970s” were squandered upon propping up the 
failed economic system.120 
3. Post-Soviet Decisions 
When the unpopular Shcherbytsky lost his place in the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU), the “pace of political change quickened in Soviet Ukraine.”  The 
Rukh (Popular Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring)121 mobilized its members for the 
March 1990 election for the Verkhovna Rada (the Supreme Soviet in Ukraine).  
Witnessing the measurable electoral success of the Rukh in which the Rukh gained over 
100 of the 450 seats contested, the ‘democratic’ wing of the Communists joined the Rukh 
candidates in action.  Together, these forces “were instrumental in having the parliament 
declare Ukraine a sovereign state on 16 July 1990.”122 
The important political development was the number of Communists and former 
Communists that broke from their previous loyal pro-Moscow attitudes and their 
willingness to create the “legal and administrative infrastructure for the sovereign 
state.”123  This practice remained true throughout the 1990s as evidenced by the fact that 
both Ukrainian presidents, Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, are former members of 
the Communist Party (incidentally, both their fathers were killed in battle during the 
Second World War). 
During the failed August 1991 coup against Gorbachev by conservative political 
forces, Kravchuk quickly realized the political gain of aligning himself with the 
nationalist tide and “spearheaded a resolution that declared Ukraine an independent 
state.”  The declaration set dates for the successful December 1991 referendum wherein 
ninety-two percent of the population voted in favor of independence, including eighty 
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percent of the “supposedly russified eastern industrial oblasts.  Crimea also cast an 
affirmative vote with fifty-four percent approval.”124 
Even though Ukraine had declared independence previously during the Twentieth 
Century, this time was different.  In 1991, the process was a peaceful one, the election 
was conducted under the watchful eye of the world, the politicians of the political system 
that was being voted out of office participated freely in the referendum, and the outcome 
was numerically significant as eighty percent of the eligible voting population 
participated.  The international community welcomed the result and United Nations 
membership as an independent state was awarded within weeks.  “Finally, the fact that 
nine out of every ten inhabitants approved independence confirmed that Ukrainian 
statehood was the wish not only of Ukrainian nationalists.  In effect, an independent 
Ukraine seemed to promise the most attractive alternative for all those who wanted 
change, whether in politics, the economy, the environment, or cultural life.”125 
 Since 1991, there have been both bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements between 
Russia, Ukraine, and other states that have either strengthened preconceived fears or 
ameliorated the concerns of the political entities within both countries.  As Ukraine and 
Russia evolve away from Soviet rule, “Ukrainian foreign policy is attempting to walk a 
tightrope between the country’s Western aspirations and its Eastern Slavic roots and 
anchors that go much deeper than seventy-something years of Soviet experience.”126  
Whether Ukraine can continue to balance its foreign policy issues in the future -- the base 
question of this thesis -- remains to be seen.  The short but full history of the 1990s is 
telling in how the ruling parties in both Ukraine and Russia approached difficult but 
interrelated issues.  In the following pages, the thesis explores two of these issues: the 
purpose of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the negotiations over 
Ukraine’s nuclear weapons.  Some agreements have been successful in solving the 
problem while others have neither effectively fixed the problem nor addressed the root 
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cause.  Because of severe distrust of the other state’s intentions, competing domestic 
actors have ladled scorn and derision upon the agreements. 
a. Commonwealth of Independent States 
During the fateful month of December 1991, the leaders of Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Russia met in Minsk and set in motion the formal process of dissolving the 
Soviet Union.  In the Minsk Agreement, signed on 8 December, the three largest 
republics of the Soviet Union declared that they “terminated its existence.”  Though the 
Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)127 in 
retrospect has drawn much legal scrutiny, the fact remains that within two weeks the 
Republics of the Soviet Union accepted the central premise that the Union should be 
abolished for something far less controlling.  On 21 December 1991 at Alma-Ata, 
Kazakhstan, eight other republics as well as the original three signed the Protocol that 
affirmed the validity of the CIS Agreement.  The CIS would “enter into force for each of 
the parties from the moment of its ratification.”128 
The charter of the CIS was decidedly brief since the newly independent 
and emerging states, “especially Azerbaijan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine were 
mindful of the experience of the Soviet Union central authorities, and were quite reluctant 
to create any powerful institutions which could threaten their newfound sovereignty.”129  
Even though most of the Newly Independent States (NIS), especially Ukraine, wanted to 
ensure that the CIS did not present Russia with a legal forum to plan “military 
intervention in the ‘near abroad’ whenever it deemed necessary,” they realized that the 
“Soviet Union’s centralized economic structure made close cooperation among the 
successor states essential, particularly since many key industries were located in only one 
or two republics.”130 
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Many of the NIS determined that after seventy years of autocratic and 
forcibly integrated rule, to deal with thorny decisions concerning “the partition of joint 
property, economic infrastructures, the armed forces and its equipment, as well as 
citizenship,” an organized approach was necessary.  Russia and Kazakhstan wanted a 
strong framework that provided for “economic and financial integration and the 
development of a joint foreign and defense policy.”  Ukraine, more so than any other 
republic of the FSU, decided early in the process that the CIS should be nothing more 
than a tool to facilitate a “civilized divorce.”  Though Ukraine was and continues to be 
dependent upon Russian energy supplies and certain aspects of economic security, it 
continues to want the CIS to be a “loose structure of fully independent countries” and 
views “an institutionalized CIS” as an entity that “would encroach upon its newly 
acquired sovereignty.”131 
Russia approached the founding of the CIS with the same official attitude.  
President Boris Yeltsin “managed to convince Russians, if not all other subjects of the 
Soviet Union, that Russia herself throughout the seventy years of the Soviet power had 
been economically exploited, politically oppressed, and deprived of her historic traditions 
and national statehood by the omnipotent Communist elite.”  Whether or not Russia 
experienced the same horrific fate of other republics is debatable.  Within the economic 
and natural resource realm of Soviet history, Russia did function as an “internal colony” 
for the Soviet Union, which constantly drained Russian resources.  “For decades Russian 
oil, natural gas, gold, and other raw materials that could have been successfully marketed 
abroad giving Russia hundreds of billions dollars were provided to other Soviet republics 
at heavily subsidized prices in exchange for low quality consumer goods and 
services.”132  However, before accepting that Russia suffered during the Soviet years on 
an equal or greater basis than did the other republics, one must also consider political and 
cultural factors, including the fact that the Slavic Russians had a significant role in 
establishing and building such a system in the first place. 
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During the establishment and ratification process of the CIS, there were 
two major issues of concern, the control and disposition of the armed forces and the 
extent of economic integration between the NIS.  Because of a number of factors, 
including the Soviet legacy, the newness of the FSU governments, the weakness of the 
FSU militaries, the intrusive nature of the inherited economic systems and energy 
infrastructures, different NIS approached the CIS with different goals.  The effectiveness 
of the CIS as a centrally controlling mechanism has not materialized since Ukraine, as 
one of its most significant original drafters and members, chose to not be more aligned 
with the confederated ideals. 
The two largest nations of the former Soviet Union maintained different 
outlooks: “Ukraine favored bilateral agreements and treaties and considered the CIS as an 
active mechanism for negotiation and consultation.  Russia, on the other hand, pressed for 
closer integration within CIS and [for the] formation of economic, political, and even 
military blocks under her leadership.”133  As a drafter of the original CIS Agreement, 
Ukraine consciously chose not to be a full member of the 1994 Economic Union of CIS 
and then, in 1995, Kuchma declared that Ukraine would not join any military alliance 
within the CIS, fearing that the structure would present undue pressure from Russia. 
b. Nuclear Weapons  
The establishment of independent states after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union resulted in the de facto realization that instead of one monolithic superpower 
maintaining control and launch authority of thousands of nuclear weapons, there were 
now four.  The Soviet Union, in its military posture, had situated both tactical nuclear 
weapons and strategic nuclear weapons (both missiles and bombers) within four different 
republics – Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. For varying reasons, Kazakhstan 
and Belarus quickly agreed to surrender their ICBMs to Russia; Ukraine did not.  Since 
their plebiscite in December 1991, Ukraine explored the positives and negatives of being 
a nuclear weapon state.  In January 1994, Ukraine finally agreed with Washington and 
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Moscow to dismantle its ICBMs, though it still hedged on the timetable -- not fully 
dismantling and “denuclearizing” itself until 1995. 
Why did Ukraine take so long to reach a final decision?  The main reason 
is that Ukraine wanted the international community, especially the West, to broker 
agreements involving Russia and Ukraine, not only in 1994, but also in the future. 
With its independence, Ukraine assumed a huge strategic force that alone 
would have been the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world.  “The strategic nuclear 
weapons were deployed on 46 ten-warhead SS-24 ICBMs (total 460 warheads), 130 six-
warhead SS-19 ICBMs (780 warheads), 25 Bear-H16 strategic bombers, each capable of 
carrying up to 16 warheads on air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), and 19 Blackjack 
strategic bombers, each carrying up to twelve warheads on ALCMs.”134  Additionally 
there were a significant number of tactical warheads in Ukraine; some sources state that 
the number was approximately 3,000135 while others have numbers that range from 2,650 
up to 4,200.136 
By July 1992, all of the tactical nuclear weapons were to have been 
removed to Russia in accordance with the December 1991 Alma Ata Agreement.  During 
the removal process, the Rada (the Ukrainian parliament), gaining its feet within the 
national security policy decision-making process, began to resent Russia applying 
economic blackmail with energy credits against Ukrainian interests, especially in regards 
to the Black Sea Fleet.137  The Rada pressured Kravchuk to halt the tactical nuclear 
weapon transfer process in March of 1992, but before Kiev could affect the process, 
Yeltsin announced in May of 1992 that all of the tactical nuclear weapons had been 
displaced to Russian territory, two months ahead of schedule.138  What remained of the 
strategic forces on Ukrainian soil were the ICBMs and the bombers. 
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Despite the fact that Ukraine still had over a thousand nuclear warheads on 
its soil, this did not endow Kiev with the capability or title of being a superpower with a 
survivable nuclear deterrent.  Launch authority, launch control, launch codes, and a host 
of other pertinent issues precluded Kiev from making such claims.  As William Kincade 
pointed out in the summer of 1993, Ukraine would have had to scale numerous and 
serious hurdles to gain such capability.139  Ukraine would have needed to gain physical 
possession and operational control while avoiding war with Russia.  Ukraine would have 
needed to develop and deploy a sophisticated early-warning system.  Ukraine did not 
have the satellites or capability to retarget the ICBMs.  The ICBMs were not dispersed 
and could easily have been targeted for a preemptive attack.  Ukraine did not have the 
maintenance system and expertise to ensure the viability of the weapons.  And Ukraine 
did not have the “training, testing, design, and production facilities necessary for eventual 
modernization.”  Even President Kravchuk noted the technical hurdles in April of 1993: 
Every sensible person knows that all the electronic circuits, 
everything that directs the warheads is in Moscow and 
Ukraine cannot change that, even if it wanted to.  For 
Ukraine to have its own nuclear forces it would have to 
own its own warheads manufactured in Ukraine.  We don’t 
have the nuclear industry or the intention to do that.140 
Regardless of launch authority and command and control (which had been 
placed under the CIS through the Minsk Agreement on Strategic Forces), Ukraine had 
nuclear-armed missiles on their sovereign territory and on bases that they controlled.  The 
attitude of Kiev shifted from “What can nuclear weapons do for our national defense?” to 
“What can we get for them?” 
In the early 1990s, the external threats to the actual state of Ukraine were 
not the greatest concern.  Rather, the utmost fear of Ukraine was that of overbearing 
Russian influence which, left unchecked, could possibly cause Ukrainians themselves 
(led by the eastern provinces of Ukraine) to accept an anschluss with Moscow in the 
future.  The fear was not of invading forces from the North and East, nor was it a fear of 
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violent revolution from within.  It was, and continues to be, the psychological anathema 
that Ukraine cannot stand up to Russia on its own.  Because of this stigma, Ukraine 
sought international recognition in 1991.  But with the recognition came the pressure 
from the West that Ukraine should forsake its nuclear weapons as soon as possible. 
When early bilateral decisions between Ukraine and Russia tipped toward 
Russia’s favor at the expense of Ukraine -- such as with the Black Sea Fleet, trade 
policies, and the return of the tactical nuclear weapons -- Ukraine began to seek multi-
lateral agreements with the West.  These multilateral treaties ensured that Russia also had 
a vested interest in adherence to the agreements.  According to Kiev, the only issue that 
kept the West involved with the Ukrainian predicament was the nuclear weapon issue.  
Consequently, Kiev used their nuclear bargaining chip to persuade the West to act as the 
honest broker between Ukraine and Russian strategic matters. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Though they share a long history of grief and bitter turmoil, the Ukrainian and 
Russian people have been exposed to different external and internal factors that influence 
their opinions of each other and their understandings of their state.  The history of 
imperial impositions resulted in Russians adopting incongruent attitudes about their own 
lineage and the constitution of their nationality.  Different Russian constituencies, for 
varying reasons, have accepted different outlooks about what constitutes “Russia.”  
Nationalistic factions continue to refer to the historical past to support their primary idea: 
for Ukrainian nationalists, history allows for a separate and sovereign Ukrainian nation; 
for Russian nationalists, history blurs such a distinction and promotes the oneness of the 
Russian Slavic people across Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. 
Because of the severe abuses by the oppressive imperial and Soviet governments, 
the Russians and Ukrainians, when presented the opportunity for independence in 1991, 
seized the chance.  Because of differing levels of institutional experience, the Ukrainian 
and Russian governments adhered to different paths in their attempts to promote their 
sovereignty and their power, respectively.  During the 1990s, Ukraine and Russia 
approached each other with different understandings of how the former states of the 
Soviet Union should interact.   
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During the 1990s, Ukraine and Russia experienced crippling economic woes, 
debated in earnest concerning the disposition of Ukrainian nuclear weapons, and 
approached the strength and wealth of the Western powers; Ukraine evolved to have a 
realpolitik appreciation of Russia while striving to maintain its sovereignty. 
To determine how Ukraine and Russia will continue to interact in the future, the 
thesis offers a current understanding of their present conditions.  Presently, since both 
states have somewhat-democratically elected governments, different domestic factions 
promote different methods of governance with varying views of the other state.  How 
these domestic factions align themselves through the democratic process assists in 
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IV. UKRAINIAN AND RUSSIAN STATE OF AFFAIRS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Reflecting the nature of their long history together, Ukrainian and Russian 
independence in 1991 resulted in different understandings of how each country should 
approach their goals of economic strength and national security.  Because of differences 
in ethnicities, natural resources, industrial infrastructure, landmasses, historical 
appreciations, and perceptions of others, Ukraine and Russia, as well as most other states 
of the former Soviet Union, took different paths toward reaching their intended goals. 
This chapter illustrates the present situation focusing on the Ukrainian-Russian 
relationship.  It delineates the major domestic competitors within each country and 
specifies certain partialities and policies of those players resulting from their own 
historical experience.  It first details Ukraine’s domestic situation, explaining the geo-
strategic importance that the West assigns to fostering a strong and independent Ukraine.  
It then explains the factors, specifically energy requirements and monetary gain that, at 
least in the near future, inherently tie Ukraine to Russia. 
The chapter then explores the different domestic political projects in Russia.  
Through different analyses of the historical record, varied prejudices and perceptions 
evolved, forging different opinions about the future goals of Russia and what Russia 
should be.  Personal experiences and economically vested interests create affinities 
toward five different state-building projects, identified by Igor Zevelev.141  For 
theoretical usefulness, the thesis applies Glaser’s labels to each project, thus affording 
Ukraine an appreciation of the benefits and dangers of each project.   Though each 
project has a different approach to dealing with the NIS, political expediency has required 
the five projects to enter coalitions with the most similar projects.  The chapter concludes 
with a subjective determination of the which project the current Russian administration 
adheres to, and thus, deduces which project the domestic opposition in Russia ascribes to 
as well. 
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B. UKRAINIAN SITUATION 
1. Geo-strategic Importance 
a. Location 
Ukraine has the geo-strategic position and the natural resources to make 
the country economically and militarily strong as either an independent state or as a 
valuable member of an alliance.  Recent political decisions and embedded corruption, 
coupled with a woefully dependent industrial capability, however, will continue to 
hamper the state on any path to sustained progress. 
Ukraine’s size, its neighbors, and the importance of the region as a whole 
give great strategic meaning to the West’s desire for a vibrant and independent Ukraine.  
Comprised of over 600,000 square kilometers, which is slightly smaller than the state of 
Texas, and a population of 48,396,000 people,142 Ukraine maintains the inherent size of a 
regional power.  It is one of, if not the most geographically dominating state bordering 
the Black Sea, with the seacoast on the Black Sea of 1533 kilometers and on the Sea of 
Azov for 225 more.  It neighbors the Russian Federation for 2484 kilometers as well as 
Belarus, Moldova, and four members of NATO (Poland, Hungary, Romania, and 
Slovakia), totaling near 7700 kilometers. 
Both Ukrainian and international leaders have envisioned Ukraine as a 
European state in the future.  During the 1990s Ukraine became a founding member of 
NATO's Partnership for Peace program, it participated in NATO peacekeeping missions 
in the Balkans, and it signed a “cooperation agreement with NATO’s highest decision-
making body, the North Atlantic Council” in 1997.  In May 2002, Ukraine signaled that it 
would also like to pursue full NATO membership.  Receptively, “NATO has long said 
Ukraine’s geographic position, between NATO and Russia, is important in constructing a 
stable security system for Europe.”143  United States President George W. Bush, while 
speaking in Poland stated, “The Europe we are building must include Ukraine, a nation 
struggling with the trauma of transition. Some in Kiev speak of Ukraine’s European 
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destiny. If this is their aspiration, we should reward it.”144  Whether or not Ukraine fully 
intends to join Europe as a full-fledged participating member depends more on Kiev’s 
political actions and economic capabilities than upon their geographic location. 
b. Natural Resources 
Besides Ukraine’s strategic location, following the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, Ukraine was judged to be in excellent shape for a transition to western 
practices mainly due to its land and its natural resources.  Despite wavering political 
decisions and economic reforms, the wealth of the land continues to provide promise for 
the future.  Iron ore, coal, manganese, natural gas, oil, salt, sulfur, graphite, titanium, 
magnesium, kaolin, nickel, mercury, and timber are mined for export.  With fifty-eight 
percent of its black-earth arable, Ukraine continues to produce grain, sugar beets, 
sunflower seeds, vegetables, beef, and milk.  Effective land management and better 
production techniques, coupled with useful export markets, would provide Ukraine a 
greater amount of hard currency that it desperately needs for debt reduction and 
infrastructure modernization. 
c. Infrastructure and Industry 
Ukraine continues to suffer from the inherited decay of communism.  
Although it assumed a substantial industrial infrastructure (one that supported the USSR 
and the Red Army), Ukraine’s industry needed to be overhauled to meet the new 
challenges of independence.  Although its heavy industry still caters to the construction 
and repair of Soviet-style armaments, Kiev realized that it needed to diversify in 
production and quality.  When Ukraine became independent, over eighty percent “of its 
industrial enterprises lacked important components of the technological cycle and badly 
needed renovation of their technological structure or even radical reconstruction.”145 
The nation’s energy infrastructure and policies, which became thoroughly 
convoluted during the Soviet era, are still impacting Ukrainian economic health and 
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security and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.  Though the nation is rich in 
natural gas, oil, and coal, the residual Soviet infrastructure of production, distribution, 
importation, exportation, and consumption continues to be extremely out-of-balance.  
Political indecision, lack of personal and business capital, and corruption continue to 
erect formidable barriers to any long-term viability options that are required of this vital 
industry.  
2. Domestic Influences and Political Tendencies 
Many pundits explain Ukraine’s difficulties in fortifying its economic, political, 
and military strength as being due to the contrasting desires of two extremes -- the 
nationalists in the western provinces versus the Russophiles in Crimea and the eastern 
provinces -- competing to gain the political support of the center populous.  Though the 
nationalist forces were instrumental in the drive to gain independence from the 
communist Soviet Union, today’s Ukrainian political discourse also entails a struggle 
between those who advocate reform versus those who seek to maintain their hold on 
power.  Two issues factor heavily into this position: first, a lack of societal organization, 
which facilitates voter apathy on national and international matters and second, a political 
hierarchy that willingly takes advantage of the voter apathy, promising reforms to attain 
power but rescinding those promises to facilitate their political livelihood. 
a. Lack of Civil Society 
One of the onerous residual effects of the many years under the Russian 
empire and the Soviet Union is the inability of the populations to develop institutions of 
civil society.  With the lack of civil society, Ukrainians have been slow to organize and 
have been unable to effectively promote democratic institutions or challenge “the rule of 
deeply corrupt, short-sighted, and incompetent elites.”146  Because of an undeveloped 
ability to organize and confront the ruling elites on unpopular issues, Ukraine has, for the 
better part of the last decade, fallen into a rut that minimizes the public’s ability to affect 
public policy.  
In some instances, the inability to effectively challenge the central rule can 
be the lesser of two evils, especially in a newly democratizing state where public opinion 
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can sometimes be whipped up for extremist purposes by a radical minority.  In other 
instances, the same inability to organize allows for corrupt rule to remain unchecked.  As 
Dmitry Kornilov, a Russian nationalist in Donetsk, Ukraine, opined, “the parties of power 
here, the bureaucrats-politicians and their business allies, are terrified of political parties, 
which would mean that elections would lead to genuine changes of power – their 
power.”147  Similar vents of frustration emanate from the western provinces as well, 
usually focusing upon the nationalist sentiment.  Thus, the eminent problem that Ukraine 
faces is the lack of a “national” civil society as opposed to the readily vibrant 
“nationalist” civil society. 
b. Failed Political and Economic Reforms 
A short review of the major political and economic reforms during the 
1990s illustrates the problems and challenges that Ukraine faces in the upcoming years.  
In 1991, Kravchuk, supported by the nationalists from the western provinces, set about on 
a course that attempted to make a clean break from the Soviet dominance.  Using the CIS 
as a framework for a civilized divorce, Ukraine undertook several initiatives to delineate 
their differences.  It constructed friendly working relations with all republics of the 
former Soviet Union as it resisted efforts to make the CIS into another iteration of the 
Soviet Union.  Soon after independence, Ukraine looked to the West and the international 
community for support.  It willingly gave up its tactical nuclear shells to Russia, it 
eventually surrendered its strategic nuclear weaponry after gaining some western security 
assurances and monetary support, and it proclaimed itself neutral but then actively took 
part in NATO-led exercises.  Mounting fuel debts coupled with their entwined 
infrastructure with Russia, however, quickly closed any window of opportunity for a 
Ukraine to make a clean break from Russian economic influences. 
The state economy faltered under the failed central economic planning left 
over from the Soviet Union as the ex-communists moved into control of the Rada.  One 
day, the communists controlled the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Ukraine, 
practically the next day the same individuals were elected to the Rada.  Loosening of the 
centrally planned economy with market liberalization, however small, provided those 
with the capability from the beginning to cash in on the opportunity.  Most other 
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Ukrainians saw “sausage issues” and their relative decline (factors affecting the quality of 
everyday life) take precedence over issues of strategic position, NATO inclusion, and, to 
some extent, the “pointlessness of democracy.”148 
The political and economic reforms deemed necessary for western 
investment were short-circuited from the start by “oligarchic centrist political forces.”  
Allied with whoever was in the seat of the presidency, the oligarchs “control the 
government and parliamentary leadership” and “espouse the rhetoric of reform and 
integration into Europe, but are not willing to undertake the domestic reforms 
prerequisite to membership.”149 
The 1994 presidential election pitted President Kravchuk against Prime 
Minister Kuchma in the context of worsening economic conditions.  Promised economic 
reforms after 1991 never materialized in theory or practice.  Kravchuk continued to run 
on a pro-independence platform, though somewhat tempered from 1992.  Kuchma, on the 
other hand, ran on a platform that claimed an independent state but one that was realistic 
in its assessment of Russian influence.  Kuchma won the election promising “an official 
status for the Russian language, better relations and more-open borders with Russia, and 
a Ukrainian constitution with more powers for the regions.  None of these promises have 
been kept.”150 
Despite his election promises, Kuchma soon embarked upon a governing 
style that indicated his understanding of pragmatic rule – enact executive decisions and 
guide legislative acts that do not tip the balance too far from the political center.  The 
Ukrainian center of gravity since independence is the power of the ex-communist 
business oligarchs.  Political decisions emanating from Kiev would usually have the 
oligarchs’ business interests in mind, even if such decisions require closer collaboration 
with Moscow and away from western integration.  Arriving in office, Kuchma publicly 
stated his desire to integrate the economy along western ideals.  He lost the opportunity 
when he failed to enact meaningful reforms during the first four years of his 
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administration, allowing the oligarchs to solidify their grip on the organs of the economy.  
Kuchma gave up on his electoral position of gaining official recognition for Russian 
language due to nationalist pressure from the western provinces, ensuring that he did not 
alienate the nationalists who are the most organized and vocal polity within Ukraine. 
In the foreign policy arena, “Ukraine’s leaders have repeatedly claimed 
that its foreign policy is neither pro-Western or pro-Russian, but pro-Ukrainian,” but 
journalist Taras Kuzio defines it more as “pro-Kuchma.”151  To his credit, Kuchma 
managed some major political successes abroad, specifically, acquiring Western 
assurances in return for the strategic nuclear weapons, ushering the completion of the 
Black Sea Fleet Accords (though the measure postponed important territorial sovereignty 
issues), and the signing of the 1997 Treaty for Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership 
between Russia and Ukraine. 
The basis of all three of the above successes was willingness to do what 
Russia asked as a requirement to retire official Ukrainian energy debts or provide 
required fuel in exchange for increased business and economic integration between 
Ukraine and Russia.  Because of such agreements, the Ukrainian ex-communist oligarchs 
fortified their positions of wealth and power while Kuchma remained seated as President. 
Since Ukraine and Russia are both “privatized states” in which “the state functions to 
defend the interests of a small capitalist class,” the Ukrainian business energy barons 
directed the foreign policy inclinations to where they were best suited.  In the early years, 
that direction was toward Russia.  When the Russian oligarchs wanted more from the 
Ukrainian barons than what was expected, the Ukrainians shifted their business interests 
(and thereby the foreign policy interests) toward the West.152 
Although Ukraine has searched for further integration with the West on 
both economic and military matters, specifically seeking NATO inclusion in 2002, 
Kuchma’s personal past infractions have been detrimental to Ukrainian western 
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integration.  Tainted by official scandals and corruption, the Ukrainian international 
image has become tarnished.  The September 2000 murder and beheading of the 
opposition journalist Grigory Gongadze, coupled with a cassette tape linking Kuchma to 
the crime, has cast a shadow on the Ukrainian president.  The March 2002 legislative 
elections were deemed “only partially free and fair.”  Kuchma’s tactic of “forcing 
businessmen to join his United Ukraine faction (his political party) to make it the largest 
as a way to have the head of the presidential administration elected parliamentary speaker 
has only served to confirm the view that Kuchma’s domestic policies are at odds with his 
pro-EU (European Union) rhetoric.”  Other instances of “high levels of corruption, arms 
trafficking, …and one of the worst records in Europe of attacks on the media” have 
further challenged Kuchma’s standing within the West.153 
Because of Kuchma’s tainted history and an unwillingness to implement 
the needed reforms – ranging from economic to societal to judicial -- the West has 
rebuffed Ukrainian approaches (witness NATO’s official non-invitation passed to 
Kuchma during 2002 NATO summit in Prague).  The West prefers to have Kuchma 
prove them wrong in their assessments of the Ukrainian president through positive 
actions as opposed to his usual empty rhetoric.  If the reforms do not materialize, the 
West could possibly disengage entirely from Ukrainian affairs until the 2004 presidential 
election results are known.  Domestic political challenges arise from a somewhat 
unraveled collection of interests in which the West pins most of its hopes upon the 
success of reform-minded former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko. 
C. RUSSIAN POLITICAL PROJECTS154 
Leading up to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the socialist experiment and the 
republics’ travails led many to view the past as “seventy years on the road to 
nowhere.”155  The totality of control within the Communist experiment ensured that 
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when the system staggered, the entire state staggered for the scheme “had been a ‘mono-
organizational’ system in which everything, from Party to Plan to political police, had 
been structurally and functionally interrelated.”156  Coupled with the complete collapse 
of the system was the need to “create a Russian nation-state” since “no such entity as the 
post-1991 Russian Federation existed before the fall of Communism.”157  Though not 
fully accepted by all historians or political scientists, the argument is convincing that 
“ever since Ivan the Terrible conquered the Volga Khanates in the Sixteenth Century, the 
state that was ruled from Moscow and St. Petersburg never was a nation-state; it was a 
multinational empire whose principle of cohesion until 1917 had been dynastic, and after 
that date had been the Party.”158  The complexity of the Russian situation is that, not only 
does the Russian Federation and its ruling elite have to manage the domestic and 
international affairs of state, but it must also, simultaneously, help shape how the Russian 
people envision themselves in the future. 
With the fall of the ever-dominant CPSU and the subsequent rise of the Russian 
Federation, internal challenges to the existing state control emerged from different sectors 
of society.  As the Russian political system continues to develop, it has in the past decade 
and will within the coming years coalesce around shared values and splinter on 
contentious issues.  Russia, like Ukraine, is still somewhat in its infancy as a fully 
independent nation-state.  With its relative newness, the domestic political voices, loud 
and opinionated on many issues, continue to amalgamate around core beliefs and public 
policy.  With the passage of time and subsequent political victories and/or defeats, the 
many voices of the many political movements will find common issues and will solidify 
themselves into viable political parties. 
The thesis examines five different projects of nation building159 concerning the 
Russian perspective on what Russia is as a nation and how that nation should view other 
Russians within the “near abroad.”  Since the Russian Federation is still relatively new in 
existence, the development and edification of political parties is still an on-going process 
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and one that has improved since 1991.160  Without having the history that galvanizes the 
party system, the electorate tends to rally around issues that concern them instead of 
time-tested political parties.161  As a result, this thesis analyzes Russian political opinion 
in terms of “projects” rather than parties.  After detailing a project’s inclinations and 
purposes, the author of the thesis applies Glaser’s adversary labels to each project by 
assessing that project’s threat to the Ukrainian state. 
1. New-State Building 
Of the five different projects that emerged during the 1990s, the “new state 
builders” were the dominant voices within the official policy of the Russian Federation.  
The project decided to work with the given conditions of the Russian Federation of 1991.  
It was and is a proponent for the “creation and stabilization of new state institutions 
within the borders of RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic), inviolability 
of the borders between the former Soviet republics, and development of relations with 
neighboring states as fully independent entities.”162  A pragmatic understanding of this 
attitude was that since Yeltsin gained international support for the Russian Federation in 
the early 1990s, the same international community granted an equitable decree of 
autonomy to all other states of the FSU.  Yeltsin could not, without a 180-degree reversal, 
turn his back on the expressed declarations of the international community without facing 
possible international condemnation.  Yeltsin, as a realistic individual, decided to work 
with what he had helped create within the confines of international concurrence. 
The project dealt with the problems of Russian ethnic identity in a practical 
manner, determining that there were more important issues.  It promoted civic identities 
while de-emphasizing arguments of others that stated that the “Bolshevik-drawn borders” 
between the republics were inherently artificial and should expand to incorporate the 
domain of “Russian culture, language, religion, and traditions.”  The project encouraged 
the other NIS to integrate the Russian minorities into their societies while speaking up for 
the Russians human rights, and if need be, helping those that chose to migrate to 
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Russia.163  The political constituencies for the “new state builders” were the intelligentsia 
of the major urban areas as well as the Russian Federation nomenklatura; each 
constituency joined for totally different reasons.  The intelligentsia wanted a “quick and 
radical transformation from the communist state to a democratic system,” while the 
nomenklatura, consisting of high-ranking former CPSU and state officials, wanted to rid 
themselves of the “all-union state apparatus and establish its full control over Russia’s 
resources.”164 
Throughout the decade, the new state builders, in efforts to improve their political 
numbers, allied themselves with smaller liberal parties that advocated separation from the 
other Soviet successor states even while supporting the human rights and cultural needs 
of “compatriots abroad.”165  Implementing their realistic understanding of their economic 
conditions as left by the Soviet era, they fostered programs that provided for the 
necessary economic integration among CIS states.166 
When Glaser’s model is applied to the “new state building” project and those that 
support such tactics, the adversary posed to Ukraine is relatively straightforward in its 
intent and conducive to Ukraine’s overall security.  In other words, the new state builders 
in Russia could be classified as an ally of Ukrainian independence.  The new state 
builders are not greedy as they respect the inviolability of the borders between Russia and 
Ukraine.  The new state builders are secure in their understanding that the Ukrainian 
leadership does not pose any threat to their ability to stay in power or drastically threaten 
vested interests of the intelligentsia or the nomenklatura. They are clear-sighted toward 
the Ukrainian situation as both states continue to struggle to improve their economic 
situations.  However, certain proponents among the new state builders, can, if left 
unchecked, threaten Ukraine’s economic independence, and therefore threaten Ukraine’s 
security.  The only measurable threat that the new state builders can pose to the long-term 
security and independence of Ukraine is if Ukraine becomes economically viable apart 
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from the economic health of the Russian Federation, thereby infringing upon the 
livelihood and vested interests of the nomenklatura. 
One of the greater effects upon the new state builders is their reliance upon the 
moral and economic support of the international community and the West.  If they violate 
the principles of self-determination of Ukrainians, they loose the support of the nations 
that in theory support the intelligentsia.  If the nomenklatura violate voluntary Ukrainian 
efforts that attempt to establish economic independence and full integration in the world 
market, then the international economic structures may withdraw their support from the 
Russian Federation.  These international factors, more than anything, restrict the new 
state builders from going too far in encroaching upon Ukrainian interests. 
2. Ethnonationalism 
The main concept behind the ethnonationalism project is the “importance of 
Russian ethnicity for state and nation building.”167  The political program of the 
ethnonationalists is to “unite Russia with Russian communities in the near abroad and 
build the Russian state within the area of settlement of the Russian people and other 
Eastern Slavs.”168 
The Russian ethnonationalists had appeared in the beginning of the Twentieth 
Century and “advocated unconditional primacy of ethnic Russians in the empire.”  
Militant and extremist in action and thought, the early ethnonationalists were represented 
by four major groups -- the Russian Assembly, the Russian Monarchist Party, the Union 
of Russian People, and the Mikhail Archangel Russian People’s Party.  The latter’s 
program stated in 1908 that  “The Russian People…has the right to be a prime, ruling 
people in the state’s life, even more so in the state’s creative transformations.  The 
Russian language is a dominant language in all domains of the indivisible Russian 
Empire.”169 
The super-Russian credo remains current today, however a marked difference 
between the two eras stipulates that the early ethnonationalists wanted to maintain the 
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empire “while the modern Russian ethnonationalists argue that the empire was a burden 
for the Russian people.”170  During the 1990s there were also moderate and extremist 
ethnonationalistic groups.  From 1991 through 1993, the Christian Democratic Party and 
the Constitutional Democratic Party represented moderate faction.  In the early 1990s, 
extremist groups, exemplified by the Pamyat,’ formed to promote the ethnonationalist 
credo. Following Yeltsin’s September-October 1993 assault on the parliament, the 
Russian President quickly branded and outlawed all ethnonationalists after their “well-
organized” support of the rebellious legislature.  After the banishment, the movement lost 
overt support until 1995.171 
From 1995-1998, different factions of the ethnonationalism sentiment emerged 
and solidified behind strong and vocal leaders.  Derzhava, which was led by Aleksandr 
Rutskoi,172 and the extremist National Republican party, headed by Nikolai Lysenko, 
pulled the ethnonationalist vote apart, mainly due to the extremists’ complete rejection of 
“western values” dealing with “democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.”173  After a 
number of weak electoral showings, especially in the 1996 presidential race,174 the 
ethnonationalist party leaders were unable to overcome differences among themselves 
and therefore left the sizeable minority bloc without representation in the congress.  
Despite an insignificant showing within national elections, the ethnonationalist 
movement continues to have support throughout segments of society including 
“representatives of the intelligentsia (mainly from small and medium-size Russian cities, 
                                                 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid., p. 70. 
172 Aleksandr Rutskoi, who at one time was Boris Yeltsin’s vice-president, gravitated amongst 
different political parties throughout the 1990s.  As Vice President of the Russian Federation, he denounced 
Yeltsin’s 1992 economic “shock therapy” reform plan as economic suicide.” See Remington, p. 44.  During 
the 1993 White House revolt, Rutskoi was declared president by the “rump congress.”  With the eventual 
collapse of the revolt, Rutskoi was arrested with the other hard-line leaders.  He was released in 1994 under 
an amnesty plan but remained Yeltsin’s chief critic.  In 1995 he nominated by the Derzhava (Strong State) 
Party “a loose coalition of ex-Communists and other hard-liners” as its presidential candidate in the 1996 
election, but he withdrew in favor of Gennady Zyuganov.  Family Education Network, accessed online 19 
November 2002, <http://www.factmonster.com/ce6/people/A0842776.html>. 
173 Ibid.  
174 Remington, p. 162. 
74 
as well as from the countryside), the Cossacks, dislocated workers, and part of the new 
entrepreneurial class.”175 
The most significant proponent of ethnonationalism from the intelligentsia is 
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who “is not ashamed of being Russian” and is most “concerned 
with the preservation of his people, which, according to him, was almost ruined by the 
self-imposed burden of empire.”176  Because of Solzhenitsyn’s political gravitas, his 
views are likely to get at minimum a respectful hearing from all leaders with populations 
that might be affected by his views.  Instead of demanding the reestablishment of a 
Russian empire, he “prescribes different policies” for different groups of Russians within 
the near abroad. 
He proposes the evacuation of those Russians from Central 
Asia and Transcaucasia who wish to leave those countries, 
while advocating dual citizenship to those who stay behind.  
He also urges Russian leaders to demand from the Baltic 
States compliance with international standards of national 
minority rights.  Finally, and most important, Solzhenitsyn 
advocates that leaders work toward “possible degrees of 
unification in various areas with Belarus, Ukraine, and 
Kazakhstan, and strive, at the very least, for ‘invisible’ 
borders.”177 
By taking Solzhenitsyn at face value and applying a logical deduction of his ideas, 
Ukraine and other NIS with sizeable Russian minorities should understand that 
distinguished illuminati in Russia harbor designs upon Ukrainian sovereign territory.  The 
international lines that ethnonationalists want to redraw do not mirror those of the neo-
imperialists or those that advocate the restoration of the Soviet Union or an empire along 
those lines.  Though there are advocates of a more extremist plan that that of 
Solzhenitsyn, such as Nikolai Pavlov of the National-Republican Party of Russia, most 
ethnonationalists base their foreign policy on “the firm belief that reunification of the 
Russian people is natural and inevitable, and that until the Russian question is resolved, 
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international stability is impossible.”178  Focusing upon the West Germany’s successful 
“wait-it-out” policy in its denial of recognizing the legitimacy of East Germany, Nataliya 
Narochnitskaya stipulates that the Russian government should not forge any 
“international treaties and agreements, conventions and multilateral documents” that 
would legitimize “the current state of the Russian people, and the seizure of its historic 
long-standing territories and sacred things.”179 
The poor showing of ethnonationalists in recent Russian elections should not give 
Ukrainians a false sense of security.  If the Russian Federation domestic situation 
worsens to a greater degree, often the first vocal cry of the ruling elite is to blame some 
outsiders for their troubles.  Usually the “others” will be differentiated by race or 
ethnicity as exemplified throughout many battlefronts during the Second World War and 
more recently in the Balkans.  Lieven determines that in the past, Russians have not “seen 
themselves as an ethnic nation” as have the Balts, Caucasians, and Ukrainians as each of 
the countries have coalesced around an ethnicity to distinguish themselves from the great 
Russian.   He further states, “The danger is that precisely these examples on their 
[Russian] borders may lead Russians to adopt this type of self-definition” which could 
kindle the ethnic flames.180 
The ethnonationalists present Ukraine with an adversary that is greedy in its 
desire to unite ethnic Russians of Ukraine as well as striving to reacquire under the 
Russian banner all of the “historic long-standing territories and sacred things” of by-gone 
Russia.  Such territories would, by all accounts, include the Southern Steppe and the 
Crimean peninsula.  They are insecure in their present standing since they believe that the 
present political situations place their Russian brethren in harmful circumstances and 
thereby dominated by non-Russians.  To make matters worse for the Ukrainian 
leadership, the Russian ethnonationalists are myopic in their views of other nationalities 
and geo-political situations.  Though they may be willing to wait, a la West Germany, 
they still do not accept the current conditions of Russians abroad as any thing but a 
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temporary circumstance that will change, in time, in their favor.  This myopic perspective 
could lead to two possible misperceptions of Ukraine’s intentions and capabilities.  The 
first is that it could cause the Russians to overestimate Ukraine’s capabilities and 
determination, thus causing Russia to move toward a more deliberate approach.  The 
second is that the clouded understanding makes the Russians underestimate the Ukrainian 
resolve, leading Russia to be aggressive toward Ukraine without acknowledging how this 
might produce an aggressive response by Ukraine, which then escalates to greater 
aggression by both sides. 
3. Restorationalism 
Hardly varying in form from the pre-1917 imperialism,181 the main aim of the 
restorationalism project is “to restore a state within the borders of the USSR” which, by 
design, would also resolve the Russian Diaspora.  The restorationalists of the Russian 
Federation would, however, choose to take more active measures to support the Russian 
population in the near abroad prior to the re-establishment of the Union.  Such actions 
would include “economic sanctions and threats of military intervention.”  Upon the re-
establishment of the Soviet Union, the new Union would be based upon administrative 
guberniyas182 as opposed to the nationalized, ethnic-derived states established by Lenin 
and Stalin.183 
Political support for the restorationalism project “includes a considerable part of 
the Russian military and security agencies, the former Soviet nomenklatura, and ordinary 
Russians who miss the glory of the former empire and the superpower status enjoyed by 
the Soviet Union.”  The restorationalists are modernizers at heart, ensuring that the new 
Union would be militarily strong and effective and that the “development of industry in 
large urban centers” would sufficiently build the “empire with shining palaces of 
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Petersburg, great historical traditions and achievements, thinkers of genius and the 
leading culture.”184 
Recent military endeavors, especially the armed travails in Chechnya during 1994 
through 1996 and again starting in 1999, have tempered the restorationalists’ 
understanding of their capabilities as well as diminished their public appeal.  Future 
military success, however, could reinvigorate sectors of the elite toward the 
restorationalism project and breathe new life into the ideal.185 
The restorationalism project within Russia presents Ukraine with another 
adversary that, if empowered, would be always secure and greedy.  The Restorationalists 
are always secure because it is within their mantra to ensure that the state would have the 
military capabilities to maintain control over the empire -- there would be no internal 
dissent in ensuring the supreme capabilities of their military.  They would also be greedy 
in the obvious characteristic that their empire would include the land and belongings of 
the Russian Empire or of the Soviet Union.  In both cases, present-day Ukraine would be 
reabsorbed into the restored empire.  The restorationalists’ approach to the geo-strategic 
situation of Ukraine could be seen as both clear-sighted and myopic.  They are clear-
sighted in the respect that they fully understand that in order to implement their offensive 
measures, they must first understand the defense capabilities of Ukraine.  After 
determining what Ukraine can do to stop a possible conquest, the restorationalists would 
then apply the required amount of offensive military capability to meet the need of 
imperial conquest.  However, restorationalists are extremely myopic in not 
comprehending the negative reactions, wrought by their aggressive military strategy, 
from the international community. 
4. Hegemony and Dominance 
Very similar to those who espouse the restorationalist approach of imperialism is 
the “hegemony-and-dominance” political faction.  According to Antonio Gramsci’s 
theory, a country “becomes hegemonic because other actors willingly or subconsciously 
defer to it, even if they wish to do otherwise.  The followers comply because they see 
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both the leader’s policy position and its putative power as legitimate.”186  The project 
intends to build the state “within the borders of present-day Russia accompanied by 
subjugation of other successor states and the creation of a buffer zone of protectorates 
and dependent countries around Russia.”187 
As the hegemonic supporters view the Diaspora, the Russians in the “near 
abroad” present an issue that can be exploited to their favor.  Two main individuals have 
carried the issue toward the brink of policy.  The first one is Yuri Luzhkov, leader of the 
Fatherland Party and the mayor of Moscow,188 who openly declared while in Ukraine 
“No Russian will be comfortable until Sevastopol is returned to the Russian 
Federation…. Sevastopol is a city of Russian glory. It was and remains a Russian city and 
we should defend its right to be a Russian city.”189  The second influential member of the 
“hegemony-and dominance” project is Luzhkov’s political mentor, Konstantin Zatulin, 
who in 1997 authored a “bold” report on Russia’s stance toward the CIS.  The “report’s 
explicitly hegemonic approach” stipulated that Russia could replace its official 
integrationalist policies with more aggressive ones “in order to prevent the Soviet 
successor states’ anti-Russian policies” by encouraging “political instability and 
interethnic tensions.”  Though the Kremlin officially rebuked the report, parts of it were 
included in President Yeltsin’s “behind closed doors” speech during the May 1997 CIS 
summit.  In November 1998, Zatulin was elected chairman of the Derzhava movement, 
thereby acquiring the “hegemony and dominance” project a party base formerly 
controlled by the restorationalists.190 
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Besides being supported by a portion of the nomenklatura, the major constituents 
of the project include many who favor the idea of imperialism.  It is perceived that 
“dominance over the near abroad is the first step toward empire.”  With such an 
understanding of the desired “dominance” progression, the type of adversary that the 
hegemonic project shows is very similar to the restorationalist -- always secure, greedy, 
and clear-sighted.  The measure of clear-sightedness could be argued, as it appears that 
the supporter of the “hegemonic” project could take more risks in its foreign policy 
toward Ukraine by pushing for more aggressive tactics.  These aggressive tactics by a 
Russian hegemonic power could provoke returned aggression from Ukraine, but also, 
more importantly, a harsh response from the West.  Thus, the clear-sighted label could be 
clouded by the dominator’s aggressive drive toward reestablishment of the empire.  And 
because of this semi-clouding of its full vision and understanding of capabilities and 
intentions, the thesis deduces that the hegemonic project is a greater risk to Ukraine than 
would be the restorationalist. 
5. Integrationalism 
The fifth and final project is Integrationalism.  It favors “the promotion of 
economic reintegration, which could lead to similar coordination of defense and other 
policies…. The project is very pragmatic, emphasizing economy and security and 
downplaying more abstract components, such as identity, ethnicity, and nationhood.”  
The project “recognizes the territorial integrity and inviolability of borders” of “fully 
sovereign, independent states” while stipulating the need “for some supranational 
institutions, controlled economic reintegration, and maintenance of major symbols of 
political sovereignty, accompanied by a high level of cooperation.”191 
Such integrationalist ideas were proposed in the early years of the CIS, as 
evidenced by the plan presented by Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbaev.  His June 
1994 “Eurasian Union” was coolly rejected by many of the NIS, which had only recently 
escaped from the Soviet rule.192  Besides the independent states that still may want to 
remain independent from Russia or possibly align themselves with the West, opposition 
to the integrationalist project include: Russian elites that do not want to subsidize weaker 
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states, differences in economic reforms that have occurred since 1991, and western 
influences that “fear Russian domination (over the NIS) disguised under an 
integrationalist veil.”193 
The proponents of the integrationalist project are those that were adversely 
affected “by the severing of the economic ties among the former Soviet republics, 
especially in heavy and defense-related industries.”  Additionally, those Russian 
individuals that “not only miss the glory of the former superpower but also are also 
nostalgic about the multinational country that they used to live in and had loyalty to” 
support the project.194  Zevelev situated the reformists of Gorbachev’s era within the 
integrationalist project, wherein the Union was not dismantled, but was readjusted to 
incorporate the sovereignty of states while maintaining the need for concerted efforts of 
the sovereigns.195 
In the theoretical realm, an always secure, not greedy, and clear-sighted adversary 
would face Ukraine if the integrationalist project were adopted in Russia.  It would be 
secure in its borders, not fearing the aggressive capabilities of other states from the “near 
abroad.”  The integrationalist government, understanding the need to promote the 
sovereignty of borders, would ensure that its own borders are well maintained and 
differentiated.  An integrationalist Russia would not advertently seek “non-security 
expansion” that “increases its wealth and/or prestige,”196 since it would realize the 
practical benefits of indiscriminate free trade and sovereignty if enjoyed by all 
confederation members.  Russia would be considered a clear-sighted adversary since 
through its trade and dealings with the “near abroad” it would understand Ukraine’s 
position, both its strengths and weaknesses.  Within theory, Russia would be secure, 
knowing that its borders are safe and that nationalism fever would be tamed in favor of 
state sovereignty and economic strength. 
But the fact is that Russia would be the dominant force within an economically 
and militarily integrated system of the states of the FSU.  Unless the smaller states can 
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become autonomously stronger without the assistance from Russia, the size and resource 
differences would arbitrarily sway toward Russia’s favor.  This leads to the subsequent 
deduction that Russian interests would trump sovereignty issues of the smaller state.  It is 
because of the actual size difference between Russia and Ukraine, an integrationalist 
approach that keeps the two states as equal sovereigns is not realistically possible, thus 
Russia, without intending to tread upon its partners would default to the greedy label – 
but to a lesser extent than the more nationalist projects. 
6. Coalitions within Russian Politics 
With different interpretations of history and the travails as well as the glories 
experienced by Russians of the past, citizens of the present the Russian Federation have 
coalesced around varying core beliefs.  Those same core beliefs, due to domestic power 
struggles and internecine fighting, have shifting standard bearers and political leaders.  
However, each faction clearly wants its ideas to triumph in the electoral process. 
Since there can only be one president of the country at a time, for political 
expediency the varying projects form coalitions in which their differences are temporarily 
set aside and commonalities are promoted.  The strength and electoral success of the 
political coalition will help determine the longevity of the coalition.  Since independence, 
the Russian collations have basically established themselves along the context of 
accepting the borders of the Russian Federation or rejecting the agreed borders. 
From 1989 through 1991, during the Soviet Union’s dissolution, “new state 
builders” and ethnonationalists aligned themselves tactically since both used the same 
slogans to promote the “sovereignty of the RSFSR” apart from the Soviet Union.  
Towards the end of decade, the solidarity of the coalition diminished as the 
“ethnonationalists had become marginalized in the Russian political arena.  The reason 
for this is more structural than purely political: it is the weak Russian ethnic identity.”197  
Today, restorationalists and ethnonationalists comprise the coalition that seeks to redefine 
the present borders.  The ethnonationalists want all Russians joined, which would exclude 
western portions of Ukraine, while the restorationalists want international borders similar 
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to those of the Empire or the Soviet Union.198  Though their political power decreased 
throughout the 1990s, the rhetoric of the ethnonationalists and a resulting “incorporation 
of their ideas by major opposition parties”199 continue to keep their project and its leaders 
within the political limelight.  Coupled with this coalition are elements of the “hegemony 
and dominance” project.  Though advocating sovereign states, the “dominators” and 
business oligarchs blur the line between the ideal of maintaining strict sovereignty and 
the ideal that promotes the “creation of buffer zones and dependent countries around 
Russia.”200 
At the other end of the spectrum, the integrationalists and the “new state builders” 
move forward within the defined sovereign borders.  Both “favor civic identities, are 
moderate on the diaspora issue, and tacitly acknowledge the fact that Russia simply has 
no strength for a more ambitious and assertive policy in the near abroad.”  Differences 
between the two projects usually rest on the amount of economic integration; 
integrationalists promoting such economic and possibly military ties while other liberal 
factions preferring greater sovereignty, bordering upon isolationism.201 
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In the parliamentary elections to the Russian Duma, the numerous political parties 
basically aligned themselves around two poles: those that wanted a restoration of the 
Union, led by the restorationalists and joined by the ethnonationalists, and those that 
wanted to keep the Russian Federation within its present bounds, led by the “new state 
builders” and joined by the integrationalists and the dominators.  The restorationalists 
acquired 30.9 percent of the vote while the new state builders and integrationalists 
garnered 51.0 percent. 
7. Present Russian Leadership 
Determining where the Putin administration falls in the spectrum is an ongoing 
endeavor.  Past political decisions of the Putin administration, such as cracking down on 
the opposition press and instituting modest military reforms in the Russian Armed 
Forces, afford an understanding of their first concern -- establishing a firm control over 
the internal organs of the state and thereby improving their domestic position.  President 
Putin has aligned himself with the interests of the nomenklatura and the Russian energy 
oligarchs, understanding that their support solidifies his position of strength domestically 
and internationally.  Putin gains domestically because the nomenklatura are still the 
power brokers at the national and regional level.203  He gains internationally because the 
nomenklatura continue to hold the reigns in the energy sectors -- whose potential growth, 
modernization, and export capability is the most promising source of extensive commerce 
with western interests.  With this understood, this author states that the Russian 
leadership is domestically secure in its strength and continuing to cement its power. 
The second concern of the Putin administration, with a realistic understanding of 
the Russian economy and military strength, is to shrewdly ensure that Russia acquires the 
best possible arrangement when dealing internationally, and that goes for the NIS as well 
as the United States.  Despite Putin’s proposal in August 2002 to Belarusian President 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka that Belarus join the Russian Federation as a member state of the 
federation, many analysts saw the proposal, which was roundly rejected by Lukashenka, 
as a way of backing Belarus into an untenable position and thereby stifling the pro-Slavic 
position in Belarus and Russia.204  Putin’s position on Belarus demonstrates that his 
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administration is neither ethnonationalist nor restorationalist, rather, it is integrationalist 
in intent but possibly having a hegemonic and dominant outlook and practice for the 
“near abroad” as the nomenklatura and energy oligarchs press their monetary interests 
within the NIS. 
Whether or not Russia is always secure in its relationship internationally is 
debatable.  President Putin began his rule in an insecure position given the events 
surrounding the Chechen conflict.  Disagreements over the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
and NATO expansion further questioned Russian resolve.  But through his deft strength 
assessment of his left-leaning domestic challengers, Putin has used the international 
incidents, especially efforts against international terrorism, to burnish his international 
strength and become more secure in the international realm.  From Ukraine itself, Putin 
probably does not perceive any military, economic, or social threat.  But as Ukraine 
disjointedly made moves toward NATO, Putin, to assuage the domestic challengers, 
countered Ukrainian actions by securing Russian-NATO agreements in advance, thereby 
reducing possible threats from the West while simultaneously disarming the “threat 
argument” of the domestic political opponents, mainly the restorationalists, that perceive 
NATO expansion as a direct threat to their goals. 
In thesis terms, the Putin administration is clear-sighted in its understanding of 
the threats from abroad and Ukraine.  The administration is not greedy but because of its 
existing reliance upon economically vested business oligarchs, the capability to become 
greedy is present if the reach of the oligarchs expands without bounds.  It is secure in its 
understanding that, if it maintains its present, though slow, course of liberalization, no 
foreign threats exist, especially from Ukraine.  Finally, the Putin administration is 
somewhat institutionalized.  Though nowhere near comfortable in its practices as are the 
West European states, the regime carried over many of the Yeltsin policies which 
afforded the society to experience no abrupt change in national methods nor political 
disorder. 
D. CONCLUSION 
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Ukraine has consistently stated that it desires to adhere to the European mindset 
thereby divorcing itself from the legacy of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union.  
Stating a goal and actually advancing the same goal, however, become two separate 
matters to the Ukrainian ruling elite.  Continually balancing the desires of two 
competitive factions within Ukraine, from those that want a clean break from the East to 
those that want greater interaction – if not reintegration -- with the Russian Federation, 
the rulers in Kiev struggle with the question of national sovereignty and the de facto 
needs of a functioning state.  In addition to Ukraine’s polar attitudes toward Russian 
integration and the resulting friction, the present government is willing to abuse state 
powers to strengthen its own rule.  This governmental action further complicates the 
drive for greater Ukrainian sovereignty and strength as it forfeits the good will and 
support from the West. 
The Russian domestic arena consists of weakly defined political parties, wherein 
their members gravitate toward issues concerning post-Soviet Russian influence, 
economic strength and prosperity, ethnonationalist unity, and sovereignty of the newly 
independent states.  As political parties affiliate themselves with the political issues (or 
projects), the parties also concern themselves with other issues that overlap 
constituencies.  Because of these overlaps, one political project will share similarities 
with other projects.  Coalitions build between the projects, lending greater political power 
through greater numbers. 
As Ukraine makes national and international decisions that affect the interests of 
the Russian political projects, Kiev must determine whether its decision will either 
positively or adversely affect the Russian political projects that could undermine 
Ukrainian strength and sovereignty.  If, for purposes of its sovereignty, Ukraine must 
make an international decision that Kiev knows will offend the powers-that-be in Russia, 
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V. TWO SITUATIONS OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Conflicts, such as the Cold War, usually involve some underlying conflict of 
interests or ideologies.  But such conflicts can also be exacerbated by misperceptions.  
When two states do not understand each other’s actions, national decisions can be made 
in many spheres – economic, societal, and military -- that perpetuate reactive actions and 
undue threats. 
As Ukraine and the Russian Federation continue to establish themselves and find 
their niches in the international community, economic woes and disputed sovereignty 
claims coupled with concerns over the status of Russian minorities continue to plague the 
rulers of both states.  Common misperceptions, vested economic interests, and inherent 
biases on many conjoining issues could spell turmoil for their relations. 
Since Ukraine is weaker in size, population, military strength, international status, 
and most other measurable factors, Kiev must tread cautiously in its attempts to garner 
successful outcomes on contentious issues.  Past transactions between Russia and 
Ukraine have placed Ukrainian natural resources, economic independence, Ukrainian 
infrastructure, and Ukrainian nationality at risk as the Russian regional hegemonic power 
exerted its inherent force. 
B. ECONOMIC SITUATION: ENERGY SUPPLY 
1. Background 
Dating back to the Soviet era, Ukraine has been heavily dependent upon Russia 
for most of its energy needs.  Despite the heavy industrialization of Ukraine during 
Khrushchev’s programs, the fuel to power the defense-related industries mostly came 
from Russia proper and other Soviet republics.  Even today, Ukraine’s umbilical cord is 
the Russian energy supply, giving domestic entities within Russia an inordinate amount 
of influence over Ukrainian policy.  Because of a failure to make the necessary reforms, 
especially since the ouster of the reformist Prime Minister Victor Yushchenko in April 
2001, the Ukrainian energy sector continues to be plagued by a “confusing web of tax 
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requirements and excessive state interference in the private sector” that has resulted in a 
“poor investment climate.”205 
Despite positive signs of gross domestic product (GDP) growth in the years of 
2000 and 2001 of 5.8% and 8.9% respectively, as well as “a marked drop in 
unemployment,” Ukraine “remains mired in a transition from a centrally-planned 
economic system to a market economy.  While the country’s recent economic gains 
appear to signal that Ukraine has turned the corner, the government remains burdened by 
a $12 billion foreign debt that is continuing to increase.”206  Throughout the years since 
independence, Ukraine has made halting attempts at needed economic reforms in order to 
successfully transition to a market economy.  One of the most glaring needs of reform 
can be found in the energy sector.  A summation of Ukraine’s natural resources and 
capabilities, compared to its usage, shows the degree to which Ukraine is dependent upon 
mainly Russian imports in its economic livelihood, at least in the short term. 
a. Oil 
Ukraine maintains 395 million barrels of proven oil reserves, mainly 
found in the eastern Dnieper-Donetsk basin, and promising exploration continues in the 
Sea of Azov.  Despite these known reserves and a fifty-eight percent decrease of overall 
consumption due to the contraction of the state economy, the country still produces only 
twenty-five percent of its domestic needs and since its independence domestic oil 
production has even steadily declined in gross output.207  Thus, Ukraine imports 
approximately seventy-five percent of its oil, mainly from Russia and some from 
Kazakhstan. 
The wild card that Ukraine has used to placate the import imbalance is its 
transit capabilities.  Because the Druzhba pipeline traverses Ukraine from Russia 
westward to Slovakia and Hungary, more Russian oil flows through Ukraine to Europe 
and the West than what was exported through the Baltic States and Russia’s two Black 
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Sea ports of Novorossiisk and Tuapse, eclipsing more than 895,000 barrels in 1997.208  
With the leftover Soviet infrastructure, Ukraine has gathered usage fees and tariffs on 
Russian oil.  Additionally, Ukraine is attempting to further develop its export and 
refinement capabilities of Caspian region oil through their building of the Odesa-Brody 
pipeline and possible extensions into Poland while feeding off the Druzhba line.  With 
the pipeline, Ukraine seeks to entice Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan oil exporters to bypass 
the crowded Bosporus Straits and feed it their oil directly into Eastern Europe.209  
Ukraine would hope to receive additional tariffs from the Caspian exporting states but to 
date, “Ukraine has not yet found any oil companies to fill the pipeline” as it struggles to 
gain investment, legitimately privatize the oil sector, and have an “international 
consortium manage the pipeline.”210 
b. Natural Gas 
More indicative of Ukraine’s vital dependence upon Russian energy 
resources is the situation involving natural gas.  Ukraine maintains 39.6 trillion cubic feet 
(Tcf) of natural gas reserves, of which ninety-six percent of the extracted gas in 1995 
came from the state-owned natural gas company – Naftohaz Ukrainy.  Exploration of 
new sites has found some success, but it is estimated that ninety percent of the country’s 
biggest natural gas deposits are already exhausted.  Because Ukraine is powered and 
heated by natural gas, the nation uses approximately 2.78 Tcf per year but only produces 
272.8 billion cubic feet (Bcf).  Consequently, it imports nearly eighty percent of its yearly 
requirement, up to 1.1 Tcf, from Russia, with the rest imported from other NIS.  
Ukraine’s transit of Russian natural gas generates more consternation and 
disputes between the two countries than does any other economic issue.  Since Russia has 
used the Ukrainian pipes to send nearly ninety percent of its natural gas to Europe, cash-
strapped Ukraine has not let the opportunity for illegal tapping pass.  In 2000, Russia 
charged that Ukraine illegally siphoned off gas without payment and demanded $2 billion 
in debt payment.  For payment, Russia offered debt cancellation for equity in the pipeline 
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infrastructure.  Ukraine “balked at the idea” and sought other sources, specifically 
Turkmenistan.  In late 2001, a deal was reached wherein Ukraine would repay $1.4 
billion over ten years.211  Other subsequent agreements further allow Russia to lease 
storage sites within Ukraine.212 
In June 2002, President Putin, President Kuchma, and German Chancellor 
Gerhard Schroeder agreed to establish an energy consortium involving the three powers 
that would develop and manage the future gas pipelines.  The agreement establishes a 
ten-year transit accord that would handle Russian gas deliveries, it dramatically increases 
planned upgrades of Ukrainian pipes, and it holds the possibility that such an accord 
would stifle Russian interests in building other transit lines that would bypass Ukraine.  
According the United Financial Group, a Moscow-based investment firm, another facet 
stipulates that Gazprom, the massive Russian natural gas company, would gain “control 
over gas take-offs by Ukrainian consumers.”  With sovereignty issues at play, Ukrainian 
opposition leaders, specifically former Deputy Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, 
could challenge the passage of the accords in the Rada.213  Additionally, to avert the 
troubled countries of Ukraine and Belarus, Gazprom recently announced that it would 
construct a $5.7 billion, 3,000-mile natural gas pipeline from the “St. Petersburg region 
across the Baltic Sea to Germany and then continuing on to the United Kingdom.”  
Integrated into the “pan-European pipeline network,” it will eventually include branches 
to Finland, Sweden, and Denmark.214 
Ukraine cannot allow the energy situation to continue on its current path. 
Desired domestic growth will stipulate the need for more fuel, whether oil, natural gas, or 
nuclear.  Though Ukraine possibly has some untapped domestic natural resources, its 
present capability to tap known reserves is stunted.  Because of this shortfall, Ukraine 
must continue to import fuel.  The situation asks: From where, at what cost, and for how 
long? 
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2. Competitive Actions 
Ukraine has the option to take competitive actions to counter Russian interests 
regarding Ukraine’s energy imbalance.  Competitive, as well as cooperative, measures 
taken by Ukraine will have varying impacts on the two coalitions that dominate the 
Russian political hierarchy.  Even though some competitive actions would, on face value, 
be too controversial for either of the Russian coalitions, those same coalitions must also 
weigh the international factors as well.  A competitive action could be detrimental to 
Russia’s interests; however, the same competitive action could be viewed favorably by 
the West, and therefore tilt the balance in favor of Ukraine implementing such a measure 
as the Russian coalitions determine that western support is more important than a 
marginal loss toward Ukraine.  Some possible competitive actions are radical in nature 
and could only be imagined as a possibility if Ukraine and Russia moved precipitously 
toward an armed confrontation with threats of military invasion. 
Assessing the severity of possible adverse Russian reactions helps Ukraine 
determine whether or not choosing competitive actions helps strengthen its own 
independence and strength.  Though there are a number of actions that Ukraine could 
choose in regards to the energy situation that are competitive in nature, the thesis 
identifies four different challenging acts and assesses the possible reactions by Russian 
interests.  First, for purposes of raising much-needed revenue, Ukraine could raise tariffs 
or increase usage fees on the transit of Russian fuel.  Second, Ukraine, for reasons of 
protecting its sovereignty, could outlaw the future sale of additional infrastructure to 
Russian entities.  Another competitive action entails Ukraine, in tandem with other states 
of the FSU, pooling their collective resources and efforts to exploit Caspian Sea fuels 
without Russian participation.  And finally, in a similar vein, Ukraine could seek Western 
investment in the extraction and refinement of Ukraine’s energy resources without 
Russian involvement. 
Reviewing the qualities of the Russian coalition consisting of integrationalists, 
new state builders (NSB), and portions of dominators helps determine the possible 
reactions to Ukrainian competitive acts.  All three are clear-sighted in their assessment of 
Ukrainian strengths and weaknesses.  Their clear-sightedness allows them to understand 
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Ukraine’s predicament in a measured manner.  Both NSB and integrationalists are not 
greedy, preferring to improve the sovereign economic position of both Russia and 
Ukraine through beneficial commerce and trade.  However, because of their desire to 
have close cooperation between Russia and the “near abroad” coupled with Russia’s 
greater size and wealth, integrationalists maintain a proclivity to reach beyond the 
sovereign borders and thereby expand their reach.  The inclusion of the obviously greedy 
hegemonic dominators within Russia’s ruling coalition exacerbates the unintended 
expansionist tendencies, possibly greedy in nature, of the numerically superior 
integrationalists.  All three are secure in their knowledge that Ukraine does not pose a 
significant risk to the existence of the Russian state. 
The opposing coalition in Russia, consisting of restorationalists and 
ethnonationalists, are greedy in their goals to seek and expand Russian borders and 
strength to the detriment of Ukraine and other states of the FSU.  The ethnonationalists 
are myopic in their appreciation of Ukraine’s national needs, focusing solely on the 
ethnic issue and differences.  The restorationalists will understand Ukraine’s energy 
issues and use those to exploit them for their own gain.  However, for myopic reasons, 
the restorationalists will not understand the negative international repercussions resulting 
from their exploitation or takeover of Ukrainian interests and territories.  Ukrainian acts 
that solidify the present borders between Russia and the NIS as well as acts that 
continually move the economies of both Russia and Ukraine away from their socialist 
underpinnings toward the market model are expected to be opposed.  The 
ethnonationalists are the only project that sees Ukraine posing a direct threat to their 
understanding of the Russian state in which Ukraine can take effect negative 
consequences upon their ethnic brethren. 
a. Raise Tariffs or Increase Transit Fees 
Russia’s ruling coalition could appreciate Ukraine’s reasons for attempting 
to increase its national revenue through the increase of usage fees if money gained from 
the same fees were appropriately spent by Ukraine to strengthen its capability to be a 
more successful and reliable trading partner.  Obviously, any increase in fees or tariffs 
would need to be reasonable so as to not seriously hamper the incomes of the Russian 
energy oligarchs.  Russia, as it continues to move toward the market economy and 
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international trade, needs hard currency, not Ukrainian promises of labor, and would 
therefore understand that Ukraine needs to raise its monetary intake.  The Russian 
monetary requirements demand that Ukraine continues to pay off its official debts with 
cash as opposed to the previously common practice wherein debts were often bartered for 
goods and services. 
The restorationalists and the ethnonationalists would view a rise in tariffs 
as an assault upon the central power and ethnic center respectively.  They would oppose 
the spike in usage fees as an assault on the Russian state by renegade outer states.  Again, 
any move that raises a barrier between the center (Russia) and the strayed republics 
(restorationalist theory) or the divided Russian race (ethnonationalist theory) will be 
opposed in theory, rhetoric, and often practice.  Presently, the energy oligarchs and the 
vested nomenklatura find “conducive working conditions” under Putin’s government and 
the ruling coalition.  Not until they are harmed economically by integrationalist policy 
would they seek to change their present alignment in favor of the restorationalists and the 
ethnonationalists. 
b. Ban Sale of Ukrainian Assets to Russian Investors 
If, for purposes of national identity and self-reliance, Ukraine were to 
arbitrarily ban the sale of state-owned energy infrastructure to Russia, the ruling coalition 
and the opposition would find fault with such policy.  The only two projects that might 
allow for such an idea would be the NSB and the integrationalists. The NSB could 
support such a ban due to the nomenklatura fear that continued investment into Ukraine 
would lead Russia back to the failed past of the Soviet Union, wherein Moscow 
supported the failing outer republics to the detriment of Russia.  In theory, some 
integrationalists might voice support for Ukraine’s right to establish such a policy, 
wherein Ukraine’s sovereignty were upheld, but since it the ban is an isolationist act, 
most would not support it since it hampers the trade and integration of the sovereign 
states.  The dominators within the ruling coalition would carry the day, arguing that such 
a policy would infringe upon the market economy, and thereby deny the Russian 
oligarchs from expanding their reach.  The opposition coalition would not support such a 
ban for the same reasons in which they would challenge the raise in usage fees. 
c. Pool National Efforts With NIS Minus Russia 
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The integrationalists and the empowered hegemonic nomenklatura would 
balk at any Ukrainian attempts to create viable economic trade zones with other states of 
the former Soviet Union without Russia’s inclusion.  In theory and practice, the 
integrationalists require a sovereign and viable Ukraine that is economically enmeshed 
with Russia since Ukraine is, and will in the future, be one of Russia’s largest trading 
partners.  Efforts to impede such Russian trade with its current partners are not conducive 
to the integrationalist spirit.  The hegemons would view “Russian-excluded” trade blocs 
unfavorably for selfish reasons – the energy barons would lose their profits.  NSB 
proponents could possibly welcome such non-Russian economic blocs, as liberal-minded 
intelligentsia would favor allowing sovereign states to do as they wish (as long as the 
human rights of Russians within those states were not infringed).  The nomenklatura of 
the NSB, seeing poor states of the FSU as drains to Russia’s national resources, could be 
indifferent to the trade blocs as long as the trade did not diminish Russian strength. 
Though the restorationalists would not favor a trading bloc without 
Russia’s central authority, it could be imagined that some ethnonationalists could tender 
their support if the agreement were to focus on improving the lot of the dislocated 
workers, Cossacks, and the working class.  But such support would be debated within the 
ethnonationalist camp, since the main theme of ethnonationalism is the unification of all 
Russians under one state, not to improve the lot of all Russians in all states. 
d. Invite Western Investment without Russian Involvement 
The last competitive action is very similar to the third, inviting Western 
governments and/or companies to establish and help direct the exploration, extraction, 
transport, refinement, marketing and/or any combination of the five practices of Ukraine 
energy industry.  Without including the Russian Federation and its energy industry, such 
an act by Ukraine would be drastic in scope; it would suggest Ukraine is embarking on a 
path with clear intentions of trying to cut the economic umbilical cord between the two 
states. Ukraine’s present condition does not provide a climate that is beneficial for 
Western investment.  If Kiev has any grand designs of instituting a Western investment 
plan, it must first take the difficult steps of passing, instituting, and obeying a vast 
number of internal reforms in order to make the nation economically attractive.  The 
95 
West should not expect to see any investment plans solidified until after the 2004 
presidential election. 
Assessing the reactions of an energy investment plan that excludes Russia, 
the ruling Russian coalition and the opposition would summarily reject such a plan.  
Besides the most liberal intelligentsia of the NSB, no other project could possibly support 
extensive Western involvement in Ukraine without Russia’s inclusion.  However, 
because the Russian Federation is also only twelve years old, it is still developing a 
number of its institutions and attitudes.  Still new to the market place, Russia and its 
ruling coalition are not economically strong enough to ignore Western economic 
influences.  In order for Russia to become economically stronger and its democratic 
processes to become more institutionalized, Russia’s ruling coalition (integrationalists, 
New State Builders, and the business oligarchs) will require patience, assistance, and 
continued nurturing by the West.  They cannot turn their back on Western interests and 
ignore investment entrepreneurs until the Russian Federation is capable of standing on its 
own.  The ruling coalition also knows that there are still unreformed socialists waiting in 
the restorationalist camp that would enthusiastically attempt to undue many of the 
democratizing reforms since 1991.  The business oligarchs must understand this 
conundrum as well, thus, the Russian energy oligarchs, who would be the ones that lose 
the most if Ukraine were to adopt the Western investment plan, would need to temper 
their curt reactions and attempt to wangle the best deal possible. 
What choices are better for Ukraine security?  The author of the thesis 
believes that choices that unnecessarily increase the hostility of the Russian reaction are 
worse than those that alleviate such a risk.  In this light, weighing the projects’ reactions 
to the proposals, the worst competitive option for Ukraine in addressing its energy 
situation is for Ukraine to choose the ban on Russian investment.  It would generate the 
angst from most projects while garnering the support of only the NSB.  The second worst 
choice is the “trade with NIS without Russia.”  Again the NSB supports this act and are 
joined by a few ethnonationalists; all other projects reject this option.  The third worst 
choice is the “Western investment without Russia.”  In this option the only support would 
be from some oligarchs within the hegemons.  Depending upon the strength of oligarch 
influence within the ruling coalition could be the determinant factor upon Ukraine’s 
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decision.  The least antagonizing option would be to marginally raise tariffs and usage 
fees, as all three projects within the ruling coalition could support some aspects of the 
rate hike. 
Whether or not a marginal rate increase would be enough to help Ukraine 
modernize its infrastructure and eliminate its debt crisis would need to be studied.  If not, 
Ukraine might need to consider a less favorable competitive action, such as the “Western 
investment without Russia” or look at cooperative options. 
3. Cooperative Actions 
Just as the Ukrainian energy situation could give rise to competitive actions, the 
same situation also permits cooperative measures that could alleviate Russian domestic 
concerns.  But just as competitive acts can heighten Russian insecurity, cooperative acts, 
if applied incorrectly, could weaken Ukraine’s security thereby sending greedy Russian 
entities the message that Ukraine is weak and not determined in her own defense.  
Additionally, because Kuchma and his regime are domestically weak, both the 
democratic institutions and more importantly to Kuchma, his rule, are challenged by 
growing domestic protests for reform.  Thus, Kuchma must ensure that economic policies 
are balanced and do not tip too far in Russia’s favor.  The thesis offers three cooperative 
actions that Ukraine can take.  Ukraine could seek agreements that offer improvements of 
Ukrainian infrastructure by Russian energy companies that could lead to greater transit of 
Russian fuels.  Another cooperative measure would be to promote trade exclusively with 
Russia and within the CIS.  And still another cooperative act would promote Western 
investment jointly with Russian interests. 
a. Russian Improvements of Ukrainian Infrastructure 
If Ukraine were to approach Russia with the proposal that the Russian 
government or the Russian energy consortiums assume a larger role in the improvement, 
enlargement, maintenance, administration and use of the Ukrainian energy infrastructure, 
there would not be too much disagreement from Moscow.  Possibly the only dissenting 
voices would be from the NSB intelligentsia who want to avoid weakening Ukrainian 
sovereignty and very few elites within the integrationalist camp that do not want to 
subsidize possible external failures. 
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The major dissension that would greet Kiev would come from the 
nationalist elements in western Ukraine and also from the liberal reformists who would 
justifiably claim that Kiev was exposing Ukraine to Russian intrusions.  The amount of 
de facto control that Ukraine was willing to offer Russia would determine the amount of 
support or lack thereof from the West and the United States.  Beyond fears of Russia 
capitalizing upon Ukrainian economic insecurity and assuming control of Ukrainian 
industry without firing a shot, the United States and Europe could also fear the 
resurgence of imperial intentions from Russia.  This “imperial phobia” may be immature, 
however, Ukraine could possibly use this fear against the West and subtly blackmail the 
United Sates and Europe for more financial support. 
b. Agree to Heavier Economic Integration Within the CIS 
Another cooperative act that Ukraine could take would be to join the 
fledgling Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC),215 even though the organization 
favors Russian interests. Throughout the existence of the CIS, Ukraine has rebuffed 
efforts to formally align itself with the economies of many CIS states.  In a conciliatory 
manner toward Russia, Ukraine could agree to become more heavily invested with the 
East as opposed to following its stated goals of eventually acquiring membership within 
the European Union.216 
A Ukrainian decision to join the EAEC would drastically shake the 
alliances of the Russian political projects.  The NSB would probably continue to be 
against such a union, fearing the eventual reemergence of the failed Soviet policies, 
especially when several states within the EAEC continue to flirt with the centrally 
controlled economic model.  Also possibly coming out against such a measure would be 
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the ethnonationalists, who do not favor tying the economic health of ethnic Russian to the 
possibility of economic failures on non-Russian populations and countries of the southern 
regions of the Soviet empire.  Another project that could frown upon Ukrainian EAEC 
membership is the economically vested nomenklatura that would experience negative 
repercussions from western markets and nations.  Over time, if a reemergence of an 
economic model resembling that of the Soviet Union that could lead to military 
cooperation among the member states occurs, the West would reestablish trade barriers 
and embargoes as a logical first step.  Such measures would inevitably impact heavily 
upon the business leaders who use the current economic structures to their advantage. 
Russian proponents for a pro-EAEC Ukrainian decision would be the 
integrationalists, as long as the sovereignty of the states were not marginalized. They 
would jump for joy and declare a national holiday for their major objective -- the 
economic reintegration of sovereign states -- would have been realized.  The 
restorationalists would view the EAEC membership as a logical first step toward 
economic and possibly military integration.  Stretching the importance of Ukrainian 
EAEC membership, the restorationalists might also see the decision as an indicator that 
Ukrainian is not wholly averse to the restoration idea. 
Most opposition parties within Ukraine would also be against such an 
inclusion except for the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Socialist Party of Ukraine.  
The center-right party under Viktor Tushchenko, reformist Yulia Tymenshenko’s Bloc, 
and most of the business oligarchs supporting Kuchma’s regime would also be opposed 
to Ukraine abandoning its long-professed desire to join Europe by joining the EAEC. 
c. Promote Western Investment Coupled With Russian Interests 
A final cooperative measure that could find favor with most parties would 
invite both the West and Russia to invest in the upgrade and improvement of Ukrainian 
infrastructure.  In the event that Ukraine passes the needed internal reforms to improve its 
investment climate, Europe and the United States would welcome the opportunity to 
make Ukraine stronger to avert future Russian imperialism but also to open new energy 
fields and improve existing export facilities. 
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Obvious Russian proponents of a joint investment program would include 
the NSB, the integrationalists, and the energy oligarchs -- who would gain greater 
technology and access to the world market.  The ethnonationalist sentiment could 
possibly favor a joint venture since it would improve the economic standing of many 
Russians in eastern Ukraine as well as other dislocated workers in Russia.  The 
ethnonationalists would first need to be assured that any deal would not stifle their long-
term goals of joining the Russian people under one state. 
Any and all projects that favor a return to the imperial state would, at first 
blush, oppose such an adventure.  Thus, the restorationalists and the dominators who 
maintain an imperial bent would need to be persuaded to sign on.  Such persuasions could 
be written time-restricted leases that guarantee that the West companies will not remain 
on Ukrainian soil beyond an agreed point unless further amended.  It is assumed that all 
unreformed communists and radical imperialists in Russia and Ukraine would not favor 
such a trilateral endeavor, viewing such action as an assault upon the sovereignty of their 
states. 
4. Energy Supply Recommendations 
Weighing the Russian projects, the worst cooperative measure that Ukraine could 
take would be joining the EAEC, as the NSB could eventually be joined by the hegemons 
and the ethnonationalists.  The second worst aggravating option is the Western 
investment coupled with Russian interests, to which the ethnonationalists and the 
restorationalists, fearing Western influences, would object.  The Russian projects would 
obviously prefer the option that allows for Russian investment through out the Ukrainian 
energy sector.  As previously stated, the main opposition would come from domestic 
interests within Ukraine; opposition reformists demanding western investment while the 
communists preferring the Russian investment plan and the decision to join the EAEC. 
Ukraine will need to improve the output and efficiency of its energy industry.  
Such improvements will require investment from other states or an increase of profits 
from existing sales.  The author of the thesis believes that the competitive options do not 
offer a guaranteed rise in profits nor do the competitive options calm the fears of the 
Russian ruling elite who are more influential in Ukraine today than other potential 
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investment states.  The competitive choices risk endangering the interests of Ukraine. 
Some cooperative measures also endanger Ukrainian security as possibly too much is 
surrendered to Russian interests or those multi-national interests that are heavily 
influenced by Russian interests (EAEC).  The cooperative measure of inviting Western 
investment along with Russian interests and improvements is the best option since it 
undercuts the Russian antagonists by mollifying the disenfranchised populations.  It also 
benefits the ruling coalitions of Russia.  The determining factor to this plan is whether or 
not the Ukrainian government is willing to make Ukraine the European state that it 
desires to be. 
C. STRENGTHENING THE UKRAINIAN-RUSSIAN BORDER 
1. Present Status 
Since 1991, Ukraine has continually voiced the desire to be a European state and 
eventually accede to European Union (EU).  Failure to make the necessary domestic 
reforms along with Russian pressures have sometimes forced Ukraine to be silent about 
its desire for EU membership, for example during the March 2002 parliamentary 
elections.217  These problems have delayed Ukraine’s goal of European assimilation. 
One of the stipulations of EU membership is the capability of member states to 
control their external borders in efforts to “plan for legal migration while combating 
illegal migration and trafficking in human beings. Border management will take on 
increased importance with close co-operation in areas ranging from customs and 
veterinary/phyto-sanitary controls218 to combating organized crime and drugs 
trafficking.”219  If Ukraine is to eventually make inroads toward EU membership, it must 
establish and control its external borders with non-EU states, which includes the Russian 
Federation.  To this end, Ukraine would need to establish control facilities and access 
points, along with the required personnel to enforce the policies, thereby limiting the flow 
of goods, services, and people between Ukraine and Russia. 
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In 1997, Russia and Ukraine signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and 
Partnership that, upon ratification in 1999, formalized Russia’s recognition of Ukraine’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.  Coupled with the 1997 Black Sea Fleet Accords, the 
two states moved the Ukrainian sovereignty issue past a diplomatic stalemate and placed 
it on a path where Russia and Ukraine have different interpretations of how that 
sovereignty can be expressed on the ground.  Russia has agreed to delimitation of the 
border on topographic maps; Ukraine wants to demarcate the line so that it is readily 
identifiable on the ground. 
In April 2002 Russian First Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Valery Loshchinin, 
who coordinates Russia’s relations within the CIS, stated, “Russia takes a consistent 
stand against demarcating the border with Ukraine” since such an act would interfere 
with the cultural, economic, and personal contacts derived from “traditional” Russia-
Ukrainian relations.  He further stipulated, “Only hotheads would want to erect border 
obstacles, fences, and ditches along our mutual border,” thereby implying such ideas 
were simply nationalistic fervor and were contemporaneous with an outdated Soviet-type 
border.220 
In response, Ukrainian Deputy State Secretary Volodymyr Yelchenko expressed 
the opinion that “demarcated borders are legally indispensable between sovereign 
countries and underscored that demarcating Ukraine’s eastern borders, and securing them 
against illegal traffic of all types, constitutes a prerequisite to Ukraine’s integration with 
the EU.”221  If Ukraine wants to gain EU membership, it will need to address the 
contentious border issue; Ukraine can address the issue in either a competitive or 
cooperative manner, each having different reactions from the different political projects 
within Russia. 
2. Competitive Actions 
If Ukraine joins the European Union, it must establish control over its 
international borders with states that are not EU members – it would have no choice.  
Having a line on a map does not stop illicit trade and illegal immigration nor would it 
                                                 
220 “Moscow Differs with Kyiv’s European Choice,” Monitor, vol 8, issue 93. 
221 Ibid. 
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control legal access across a 2,000-kilometer stretch of land.  The only known capability 
of doing so is to channel persons and goods through a number of well-controlled points 
and to deny entry through all the rest.  Denying entry to the remaining expanses requires 
walls, fences, surveillance, or a combination of all three.  The act of erecting a border 
between two sovereign states can be construed as a competitive act.  For this argument, it 
is not; rather, the act of erecting the border is a foregone conclusion.  Thus, the thesis 
asks, are there competitive acts or cooperative acts that Ukraine can do that would either 
exacerbate or ameliorate Russian concerns? 
a. Ukraine Deploys Armed Forces to Establish and Control Border  
A competitive action that could exacerbate Russian political projects 
would be if Ukraine, to help establish the border, deployed members of its armed forces 
to assist in the command and control or everyday functions of the border.  If Ukraine 
were to deploy military units as complete entities to assist in the construct or operation, 
the act itself could be misperceived by some Russian interests and purposefully distorted 
for political gain by other Russian players. In the event an infantry unit, whether 
battalion, brigade, or regiment, was deployed from Kiev to the border with the sole 
purpose of assisting in checkpoint control, restorationalists could purposely raise fears in 
Russia that Ukraine is taking unnecessary hostile acts in attempts to stir the masses.  In 
order to avert the restorationalist fear, Ukraine, if needing the personnel from the 
military, should transfer those persons away from the military unit and to the official 
border/customs bureaus of the government. 
The restorationalists and the ethnonationalists would be solidly against 
any border construction no matter how the Ukrainians manned the checkpoints.  The 
NSB project would support the border project in spirit and action; the integrationalists 
would in theory support the demarcated border since they espouse the inviolability of 
border sovereignty, however, they would need assurance that promotion of trade within 
Ukraine and Russia and other CIS states would not suffer. 
The business barons of the hegemonic dominators, depending upon the 
legality of their trade, would fall on either side of the wall.  If Ukraine were to run an 
honest operation on the border and snuff out the smuggling, the honest businesses would 
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support the measures; the dishonest barons would find fault with the border and either 
attempt to subvert the border, or change their business practices.  If corruption infiltrated 
the Ukrainian endeavor, the Russian business oligarchs would act in the reverse. 
b. Ukraine Invites Strong Third Party to Assist on Border 
Another competitive measure that Ukraine could employ to help establish 
their eastern border would be to ask for the assistance of a major power.  If Ukraine were 
to request help in the construction or ask for monetary assistance, some of the same 
reactions of the Russian political projects as listed above would apply.  However, 
Ukraine must realize that inviting a foreign power in onto Ukrainian soil will exacerbate 
the vitriol of the restorationalists and the ethnonationalists.  If the restorationalists and 
ethnonationalists were successful in their efforts to create an undue hysteria about 
“Ukrainian militarization of the border,” Ukraine would be posed with an escalatory 
situation that could challenge Ukraine’s resolve.  Ukraine would then be required to 
acquiesce or to respond with determination.  Ukraine must prevent this unintended 
consequence.  Ukraine should, in advance of any border construction, coordinate with the 
ruling elites (presently integrationalists, NSB, and business nomenklatura) and the West 
(Europe and the United States) in order to assuage their main concerns. 
Rank ordering the two competitive options determines that the second 
option is the worst of the two since it gives the ethnonationalists and the restorationalists 
more reasons to object to the demarcated border than the first one.  By introducing a third 
power to the equation, sovereignty issues would be exacerbated beyond the bi-lateral 
discussion.  The foreign force introduction could give the ethnonationalists and 
restorationalists additional arguments, fostering fears of a “foreign power occupation” in 
and on the Russian border.  Unless Russian forces imminently threaten Ukraine, the 
second option offers no clear advantage over the first.  In fact, it could make the bilateral 
relations worse and thereby threaten the Ukrainian security since such a decision 
amplifies the myopic insecurity of the substantial and vocal minority of the Russian 
population, with no apparent gain. 
3. Cooperative Actions 
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As Ukraine determines applicable methods of constructing and manning an 
effective border between Russia and itself, it could look for methods that would diffuse 
the vocal opposition in Russia.  If Ukraine cannot persuade the Russian opposition to 
agree with the need for the border, possibly Ukraine could look for ways of strengthening 
both the Russian supporters’ claims  (NSB and integrationalists) and also the positions of 
those that could be swayed to accept the border (business oligarchs).  Stating the obvious, 
Ukraine must establish effective liaisons with the Russian proponents, always ready to 
diffuse any potential rift with the Russian ruling elite. 
a. Ukraine Makes Concessions on Other Issues 
A cooperative measure to lessen the strife within Russian would be to 
make conciliatory concessions upon other issues that both Ukraine and Russia hold dear.  
As Ukraine prioritizes its economic needs, if EU membership ranks first, than the 
promotion and construction of the border must rank first as well.  Thus, other issues that 
divide Ukraine and Russia slip a spot and become second order.  One issue that could be 
slip to second is the status of the Sea of Azov.  With the 1997 Black Sea Fleet and the 
Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, the disposition of control the sea 
remains unsettled.  Ukraine could offer, in return for less consternation concerning the 
border, that Russia could have unfettered access to the sea through the Straits of Kerch.  
Or another issue could have Ukraine granting an extension to the leases that Russia has 
within the port of Sevastopol. 
It should be expected that any border between Ukraine and Russia would 
never be accepted by the ethnonationalists.  For them to do so destroys their reason for 
existence.  The restorationalists are, by constitution, more understanding of Ukraine’s 
needs.  Their argument against the establishment of the border rests upon the desire to 
restore the either the imperial boundaries or the boundaries of the Soviet Union.  The 
argument can be made that gaining and keeping unencumbered Black Sea access was of 
major import to the empire.  Applying such inducements to the heretofore anti-border 
restorationalists, Ukraine could parlay this strategic need of the Russian Federation with 
their support for the Ukrainian border. 
b. Ukraine Garners Support From West to Appease Russia 
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In the same manner that Ukraine could facilitate Russian reactions to the 
international border by making concessions to the restorationalists, Ukraine, through 
diplomatic and economic channels could explore ways of bringing Russia along with 
itself to the West.  Ukraine could try to persuade the West to increase economic aid to 
Russia through the following argument:  Ukraine wants a border, Russia wants more 
Western investment, the West wants an independent and viable Ukraine, so Ukraine tells 
the West to invest more in Russia and Russia agrees to allow the border to be built. 
Once again, the ethnonationalists will balk at the existence of any 
demarcated border.  The restorationalist movement, consisting of communists, urbanites, 
displaced military personnel, and the state security agencies, need more money coming 
into the country so as to support their own organizations.  The West is one of the few 
places where such an amount of cash exists.  With other regions within the world 
simmering with unrest and uncertainty, Russia’s natural wealth and energy resources 
provide realistic alternatives for the industrial and entrepreneurial West.  If the ruling 
coalition in Russia engaged the West in such an inviting manner, the result could possibly 
divide the restorationalist project by sifting the unreformed communists from the 
disenfranchised masses.  Additionally, Western economic inducements, coupled with 
continual internal social and political reforms, could improve the economic and social 
situation within the Russian Federation and thus improve the popularity of the ruling 
elite. 
The two cooperative options will have similar reactions and repercussions 
from the Russian projects.  The ruling coalition would support both measures, with the 
“Western support” option tallying greater approval from the business oligarchs since the 
Western investments could give them a financial windfall.  But since the oligarchs will 
improve their status in each scenario, the better cooperative option for Ukraine would be 
the one that brings along the most restorationalists.  The “trade-off” option readily gives 
tangible results to the restorationalists.  The “Western support” option would require time 
for the business growth and wealth generation to result in an improved economic 
condition of the restorationalists’ supporters.  Each option has its positives and negatives.  
Both options would diminish the misperceptions of Russian actors.  However, the “trade-
off” option could result in Ukrainian domestic strife as Ukrainian nationalists could 
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bitterly protest the surrender of Ukrainian property.  The thesis thereby proposes that 
Ukraine explores the “Western investment” option as possibility to achieve a demarcated 
border. 
4. Border Recommendations 
If Ukraine moves toward European inclusion, it will have to demarcate its border 
with Russia.  Reviewing the two competitive options against the two cooperative options 
determines that Ukraine would reduce Russian concerns by incorporating the cooperative 
“Western investment” option over the others.  The worst option for Ukraine is the 
competitive “third power invite,” since it would fan the flames of the Russian opposition 
while rendering no improved capability over the other options.  Ukraine could, with 
Russian coordination in advance, use instances of the remaining two options – the 
competitive “Ukrainian troops for border duty” and the cooperative “trade-off” -- to 
decrease the aversion from Russian coalitions. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Two of the most pressing problems that confront Ukraine today are its energy 
dependency on Russia and, if it intends to gain European Union admittance, its 
requirement to physically strengthen its eastern border with Russia. 
Strictly competitive measures concerning the energy problems and debts could 
needlessly aggravate Russian political projects and could result in a negative backlash 
against Ukrainian economic interests.  Some isolated competitive measures, such as a 
reasonable transit fee increase, could be accepted by Russia, however, if certain Russian 
projects determine that the Ukrainian financial profits were appropriately used.  Other 
more competitive measures, wherein Russian energy interests were placed at a distinct 
disadvantage, would not be beneficial to Ukraine’s economic strength since most Russian 
political projects would reject the Ukrainian acts.  Ukrainian decisions to align with other 
states within the NIS or with Western powers to help improve the infrastructure and 
export capability, entirely at Russia’s expense, should be avoided. 
Cooperative measures that expose Ukraine’s long-term economic strength solely 
to Russian interests also should be avoided.  Since Russia already holds great sway over 
Ukraine’s economic prosperity, measures, such as bilateral agreements to exchange 
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Ukrainian debt for ownership of Ukrainian infrastructure, further enhance Russian 
domination over the Ukrainian energy sector.  Multilateral agreements with Western 
powers are preferred.  Measures that also guarantee assistance to Russian energy 
development and exports provide for Russian economic gain without infringing upon 
Ukrainian sovereignty. 
Competitive measures concerning Ukraine’s need to establish a demarcated 
eastern border must be avoided.  The present and future capability of Ukraine’s military, 
when compared to Russia’s, plus Ukraine’s geographic proximity place Ukraine at a 
disadvantage that cannot be resolved with confrontational acts. 
Because the border must be demarcated – a confrontational act to some very vocal 
Russian interests - Ukraine must find cooperative ways to do so that will appeal to the 
majority of influential Russians.  The thesis offers an idea in which Ukraine, prioritizing 
its needs, concedes to Russian interests on matters of less importance.  Through a 
decision, such as surrendering “sovereignty” claims over the disputed Sea of Azov, 
Ukraine might be able to gain Russian consent for the required border demarcation. 
Multiple issues integrate Ukraine and Russia.  Two of these issues are the 
Ukrainian energy dependence upon Russia and the need for Ukraine to demarcate its 
common border with Russia.  The thesis, using its constructed framework, determines 
that the best way for Ukraine to approach the two issues is the cooperative approach that 
infuses the support of Western nations.  It is noted that no decision on any matter 
between Ukraine and Russia -- especially these two -- will garner full support of all 
domestic actors.  But much like a functioning democracy, give-and-take is required to 
achieve consensus and as long as the achieved consensus does not damage the security 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Ukraine and Russia have a number of issues that cause grave concern between the 
political players and coalitions of each state.  Ever since the southwestward expansion of 
the Russian Empire, their Slavic brethren to the north have dominated the Ukrainian 
people.  Ukraine is at a comparative disadvantage to Russia in many matters including 
natural resources, military strength, international influence, and post-Soviet market 
reforms. 
Ukraine must decide upon a national path for its future; if it chooses to gain entry 
into Europe, the country will need many painful but necessary internal reforms and 
national decisions which, if successfully implemented, could cause the present ruling 
elite to lose their hold while antagonizing several Russian domestic factions.  If Ukraine 
chooses to stay on its current path of vacillation and not make a decisive move to the East 
or the West, it runs the risks of ostracizing itself from the international economic engines 
that are needed for it to improve the livelihood of its citizens.  If Ukraine decides to align 
itself with Russia, the states of the former Soviet Union, or a combination of the two, 
Ukraine could again find itself overwhelmed by Russian patronage – a condition dreaded 
by many individuals throughout Ukraine and the West. 
The author of this thesis believes that the Ukrainian people and their leaders will 
eventually choose the first option and endeavor to align the nation with the West, not so 
much for ideological affinity or determined dislike of their Russian brethren, but rather 
out of economic and social necessity.  Ukraine must expand its productivity and develop 
its natural wealth in order to continue to function as a participating state within the 
international community.  Its geo-strategic location, being the crossroads between South 
Asia and Europe, demands the attention of the Western powers.  When Ukraine decides 
to exploit its unique position – choosing a European path and implementing the necessary 
reforms, the West, with patience, understanding, and wealth, will readily assist Ukraine 
in its decision. 
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As Ukraine implements its decision to align with the West, the decision will 
invariably irritate the interests of both Ukrainians and Russians who would prefer to not 
see Ukraine, nor the Russian Federation for that matter, accept Western ideals and 
practices.  Within Russia, economic hardships resulting from their ongoing economic 
reforms, coupled with nostalgic thoughts of the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union, 
provide a vocal and influential sector of society that can influence the fragile political 
situation in Russia and, hence, the Russian stance toward Ukraine.  The coalitions within 
Russia that will oppose the Ukrainian actions will not disappear nor cease to exist in the 
near future.  Because of their influence within Russia, Ukraine must factor their power 
into how Ukraine implements its required reforms. 
The Ukrainian acts can be either competitive or cooperative in nature as viewed 
by the Russians.  Ukrainian acts that present no gain whatsoever to interests or opinions 
of the Russian domestic players or severely inhibit the Russian goals are competitive.  If 
the offended parties are influential enough, Ukrainian interests and goals can be affected 
and even stopped.  If Ukraine decides to not take competitive actions to meet its national 
goals, preferring to placate the Russian dissenters, the Ukrainian acts could 
overcompensate for the Russian interests to such a degree that the Ukrainian goals cannot 
be met.  Additionally, upon seeing the lack of Ukrainian resolve to implement its national 
goals, dominant Russians could view the Ukrainian decision as a weakness that could be 
challenged again, thereby continuing to threaten Ukrainian sovereignty. 
The thesis constructed a theoretical framework derived from the earlier works of 
two defensive realists: Charles Glaser and Jack Snyder.  The framework determines that 
the actions of Ukraine will have resonating effects upon different Russian political 
players, or projects.  The projects are identified as to their particular understanding of the 
Russian Diaspora within the newly independent states following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.  Some projects demand the reunion of all Russians while other projects 
prefer to successfully build the Russian state, simultaneously recognizing the sovereignty 
of the others.  For political power, the Russian projects have coalesced into functioning 
coalitions.  By identifying each project’s political strength as well as its coalition’s 
weakness, Ukraine can choose policies and execute actions, whether competitive or 
cooperative, that can divide the Russian opposition and diminish their influence.  
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Concurrently, Ukraine must also identify the Russian projects and coalitions that are 
supportive of Ukrainian sovereignty and tailor their decisions to bolster the political 
strength of the beneficial Russian actors. 
The framework incorporated the positive or negative effects that certain 
international factors have upon the ability of a government to realize their chosen 
policies.  The thesis determined that the Western powers would be concerned and 
extremely interested with results of the Ukrainian-Russian situation.  Because of the 
West’s concern, Ukraine and Russia could expect to receive inducements that would 
favor their positive actions.  Likewise the West would respond with negative warnings if 
the two countries chose to take actions contrary to Western interests.  One of the major 
benchmarks determining the amount of inducements would be the extent of liberalization 
throughout the country in contrast to imperial policies.  If Russia were to revert to 
previous dominating tendencies that would threaten the sovereignty of the NIS, the West 
would withdraw their economic inducements.  The final international factor affecting the 
regimes in Ukraine and Russia is the extent of the institutionalization of liberalizing 
reforms.  Since independence for both states is still relatively new, the reforms measures 
are still weak in practice and adherence.  The West would promote those policies and 
decisions that strengthen Ukrainian and Russian liberalization while understanding that 
repetitive practice, steady and patient leadership, and the passage of time are needed to 
institutionalize the required democratic and market reforms. 
The thesis states that Ukraine must recognize that its actions will have 
consequences for the domestic political entities within Russia.  Some of those entities 
have designs that threaten Ukraine’s sovereignty while other Russian entities willingly 
promote (or at least are silent upon the issue of) Ukraine’s independence.  Because of 
Ukraine’s importance, the West, led by the United States, could readily assist Ukraine in 
their interaction with Russia, but only if Ukraine firmly displays its desire, through policy 
and action, to become a liberalized state.  To this end, the United States should prepare to 
support those Ukrainian domestic political entities that are willing to reform the state 
along liberal ideals. 
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Using the constructed framework and assessing two contentious issues that 
severely divide Russian and Ukrainian domestic actors, the author of the thesis concludes 
that Ukraine, fully informing Russia of its intentions, must take a cooperative act to 
improve the energy supply situation by inviting Western investment along with Russian 
interests to improve Ukrainian efficiency and output.  This measure is the best option 
because it isolates the ethnonationalists into a smaller minority as it diminishes support 
for the Russian integrationalist argument.  The integrationalist argument loses public 
support as the disenfranchised populations common lot is improved. 
The thesis also determines that Ukraine should seek Western investment within 
Russia as an incentive for Russia to agree to border demarcation. Through growth and 
improved economic standing as the result of greater Western investment, the 
integrationalist support would be marginalized.  Improved living standards for the 
disenfranchised common Russian would undercut his or her support for the 
restorationalist mantra.  No longer would ordinary Russian long for the restoration of the 
Soviet Union or the Russian Empire as the elixir to their troubled everyday existence. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
In the construct of the thesis and its identification of the Russian political projects, 
the Russian players were identified and collated according to their appreciation of the 
Russian minorities dispersed throughout the former states of the Soviet Union.  However, 
not all influential political individuals and players have an expressed opinion about the 
diaspora, at least not as the reason for their existence.  Further research could assess the 
wants and desires, outside of opinions regarding Russian minorities, of other Russian 
interests and what are their reasons for or against Ukrainian sovereignty.  As the thesis 
determined coalitions according to how the different Russian projects approached the 
diaspora, another line or research could explore another issue that is readily affected by 
Ukrainian sovereignty.  For example, continued Ukrainian strength could adversely affect 
the capabilities of the Russian military-industrial complex.  If sovereignty issues 
emanating from the NIS threaten the strength of the military-industrial complex, different 
sectors of the Russian society will coalesce around their own particular views concerning 
the threats and promote or reject Ukrainian measures accordingly. 
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By exploring other national issues that impact the Russian sensibilities using the 
theoretical framework of this thesis, further research could help Ukraine and the Western 
powers predict the positive and negative repercussions of their actions.  Those that 
support the sovereignty of liberalizing nations while minimizing the power of imperial 
forces within the Russian Federation can be identified and implemented.  Those actions 
that fail to secure Ukrainian sovereignty because the actions needlessly inflame the strong 
opponents of Ukrainian independence, without offering a reasonable alternative, can also 
























ALCM  Air-Launched Cruise Missile 
Bcf  Billion Cubic Feet 
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States 
CP(b)U Communist (Bolshevik) Party of Ukraine 
CPSU  Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
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NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NEP  New Economic Plan 
NIS  Newly Independent States 
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